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# CLIC PAPERS

**PEACEKEEPING  
TACTICS, TECHNIQUES, AND PROCEDURES**

**Army - Air Force Center for Low Intensity Conflict**

**Langley Air Force Base, Virginia**

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<p>International peacekeeping efforts, whether sponsored by the United Nations or some other forum, have become a dominate component of today's conflict resolution. This was perhaps no better illustrated than by the recent awarding of the Nobel Peace Prize to the United Nations Peacekeeping Forces. Modern peacekeeping efforts evolved after World War II with the establishment of the United Nations (UN). Although the UN Charter did not make any provisions for peacekeeping forces, the United Nations gradually developed a body of thought and doctrine about peacekeeping. In the four decades since the United Nations began functioning, the international body had introduced international military observer groups, missions, and forces into global hot spots on 13 occasions. While the United States has always played a role in UN peacekeeping efforts, this role has generally been limited to providing financial and logistical support.</p> <p>(continued on back)</p>					
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During the last decade, the United States has ventured into several peacekeeping activities outside of the UN framework. Between 1976 and 1980, US civilian contractors and volunteers of the Sinai Field Mission maintained an electronic warning system between Egyptian and Israeli forces. As part of the Camp David Accords, the United States established the Multinational Force and Observers (MFO) in 1981 to serve on peacekeeping duties in the Sinai. In April 1982, the United States joined with several other Western powers to establish a Multinational Force (MNF) in Beirut to oversee the evacuation of Palestine Liberation Organization guerillas from Lebanon.

The purpose of this paper is to capture the "lessons learned" from previous peacekeeping efforts and to provide a basis for future development and refinement of peacekeeping tactics, techniques, and procedures. This paper provides details about how US resources should be employed in peacekeeping operations. It explains how peacekeeping forces and observer missions are planned, prepared, established, controlled, operated and supported.

**PEACEKEEPING**  
**TACTICS, TECHNIQUES, AND PROCEDURES**

by

Charles M. Ayers, LTC, USA



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## PREFACE

International peacekeeping efforts, whether sponsored by the United Nations or some other forum, have become a dominate component of today's conflict resolution. This was perhaps no better illustrated than by the recent awarding of the Nobel Peace Prize to the United Nations Peacekeeping Forces. Modern peacekeeping efforts evolved after World War II with the establishment of the United Nations (UN). Although the UN Charter did not make any provisions for peacekeeping forces, the United Nations gradually developed a body of thought and doctrine about peacekeeping. In the four decades since the United Nations began functioning, the international body has introduced international military observer groups, missions, and forces into global hot spots on 13 occasions. While the United States has always played a role in UN peacekeeping efforts, this role has generally been limited to providing financial and logistical support.

During the last decade, the United States has ventured into several peacekeeping activities outside of the UN framework. Between 1976 and 1980, US civilian contractors and volunteers of the Sinai Field Mission maintained an electronic warning system between Egyptian and Israeli forces. As part of the Camp David Accords, the United States established the Multinational Force and Observers (MFO) in 1981 to serve on peacekeeping duties in the Sinai. In April 1982, the United States joined with several other Western powers to establish a Multinational Force (MNF) in Beirut to oversee the evacuation of Palestine Liberation Organization guerrillas from Lebanon.

The purpose of this paper is to capture the "lessons learned" from previous peacekeeping efforts and to provide a basis for future development and refinement of peacekeeping tactics, techniques, and procedures. This paper provides details about how US resources should be employed in peacekeeping operations. It explains how peacekeeping forces and observer missions are planned, prepared, established, controlled, operated, and supported.

This paper drew heavily from the sources listed in the bibliography. In fact, much of the material is quoted directly from these sources. Because this document was originally written with the intent to submit it for consideration as a Joint Chiefs of Staff publication, bibliographical references were omitted. However, the author fully recognizes and gives credit to the sources listed as the originators of most of the material in this paper. Readers are encouraged to obtain these source documents for further research and enlightenment.

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## **PEACEKEEPING**

### **TACTICS, TECHNIQUES, AND PROCEDURES**

#### **CHAPTER I**

##### **PLANNING FOR PEACEKEEPING**

###### **I-1. THE NATURE OF PEACEKEEPING.**

a. The United States may participate in international peacekeeping operations as part of a United Nations (UN) or other multinational force. Peacekeeping operations take place following diplomatic negotiation and agreement among the belligerents concerning the participating nations on the size and type of forces each will contribute. These operations will be conducted in accordance with agreements among the parties to the conflict. Peacekeeping efforts support diplomatic endeavors to achieve or to maintain peace in areas of potential or actual conflict. Peacekeeping often involves ambiguous situations requiring the peacekeeping force to deal with extreme tension and violence without becoming a participant.

b. The United Nations has been the most frequent sponsor of international peacekeeping operations. Such regional organizations as the Organization of American States (OAS), the Organization of African Unity (OAU), and the Arab League have also acted in similar fashion to prevent, to halt, or to contain conflict in their respective regions. Similarly, some nations have formulated multilateral agreements to create peacekeeping missions outside the auspices of any permanent international forum. Although there have been instances of unilateral operations--such as the Multinational Force (MNF) in Lebanon--these have usually taken place with the tacit approval of a regional organization or the United Nations. In some cases, unilateral interventions, such as Indian forces in Sri Lanka, have been termed "peacekeeping," but they fall outside the use of the term if their initial role involved coercion through the use of force.

###### **I-2. THE DEVELOPMENT OF PEACEKEEPING.**

a. Modern peacekeeping efforts evolved after World War II with the establishment of the United Nations. Although the UN Charter did not make any provisions for peacekeeping forces, the United Nations gradually developed a body of thought and doctrine about peacekeeping. The term "peacekeeping force" first came into use in 1956 when the United Nations established the UN Emergency Force (UNEF) to supervise the disengagement of forces after the invasion of Egypt by Great Britain, France, and Israel in the Suez War. In 1956, the United Nations created a "Special

Committee on Peacekeeping Operations" to conduct its peacekeeping activities. In the four decades since the United Nations began functioning, the international body has introduced international military observer groups, missions, and forces into global hot spots on thirteen occasions. Once deployed, these missions have monitored cease fires, patrolled borders, supervised troop disengagements, provided internal security, preserved essential government functions, and interposed themselves between hostile neighbors.

b. Other multinational peacekeeping forces have also enjoyed some success. The League of Arab States created an Arab League Force to go into Kuwait in 1961 to preserve Kuwait's independence and integrity. This Force also helped to facilitate British troop withdrawal from Kuwait and carry out the aims of the League. The Organization of African Unity created an Inter-African Peacekeeping Force (IAF) to go into Chad. Its primary mandate was peacekeeping, although it had auxiliary tasks of supervising national elections and assisting in organizing a national army. The IAF was late in getting into the country in mid-December 1981, and lack of money dictated its departure in June 1982 before it could successfully fulfill its mandate. The United States provided limited assistance to the IAF.

c. Although the United States participated in the Inter-American Peace Force (IAPF) established by the OAS in 1965-66 to restore order in the Dominican Republic, it did so only after it had already unilaterally intervened in the conflict to prevent a perceived communist takeover. It is the only regional organization that includes the United States among its members and that has created a peacekeeping force. In this instance, the OAS served to regionalize and de-emphasize the unilateral US role in going into the Dominican Republic, where the United States had followed the pattern of "intervention first, peacekeeping later." In 1983, in Grenada, only after seizing the island to protect American lives, did the United States establish a multinational Caribbean Peacekeeping Force (CPF) to maintain order until the local authorities could organize and assume control.

d. The United States has always played a role in international peacekeeping under the United Nations. To some degree, this is natural since the United States is one of the five permanent members of the UN Security Council that has a veto over substantive decisions of the Council and a greater responsibility, incorporated into the Charter, for maintenance of international peace and security. However, the United States has not always been vigorously supportive of international peacekeeping. The American position has been influenced by its perceptions of its national interest as well as by the ability of the five permanent members of the Council to agree on establishment of a mission.

e. The United States has provided relatively few troops to UN peacekeeping endeavors. In fact, it has contributed military observers to only two UN sponsored peacekeeping activities. Beginning in 1948, and continuing to the present day, the United States has participated in the United Nations Truce Supervision Organization (UNTSO), which supervises armistice and cease fire arrangements between Israel and its neighbors. From 1949 to 1954, it also provided a two-man team to the United Nations Military Observer Group in India and Pakistan until the Government of India secured the removal of US personnel from the force.

f. The United States never provided full ground units to a UN peacekeeping operation. The reason is that superpower participation may threaten to escalate rather than reduce conflict. The United States has, however, provided supplies, money, and transportation in support of about two-thirds of all UN peacekeeping efforts. The lack of US ground-force participation is the result of a deliberate policy by the United Nations to rely upon small, non-aligned nations for the bulk of its peacekeeping forces. The United Nations has consciously avoided using troops from the permanent members of the Security Council in order to preserve an atmosphere of non-partisanship and avoid entanglement in superpower rivalries.

g. The United States has contributed financial as well as other kinds of support for these peacekeeping operations and missions created by the United Nations. This other support has included airlift/sealift, communications, local transport, arms and ammunition, food, and such necessities as maps, language phrase books, inoculations, clothing, blankets, and medical services. For most large peacekeeping operations, the United States has provided "initial" airlift services at no cost either to the United Nations or the country providing the unit.

h. During the last decade, the United States has ventured into several peacekeeping activities outside of the UN framework. Between 1976 and 1980, US civilian contractors and volunteers of the Sinai Field Mission maintained an electronic warning system between Egyptian and Israeli forces. As part of the Camp David Accords, the United States established the Multinational Force and Observers (MFO) in 1979 to serve on peacekeeping duties in the Sinai. The establishment of the MFO corresponded with the expiration of the UN's Emergency Force II (UNEF II), which had previously served in the area. The MFO functioned in lieu of UNEF II for two reasons. First, member states of the United Nations were unable to agree upon a method of using peacekeeping forces to support the controversial treaty between Egypt and Israel. Second, both Israel and Egypt preferred to have a non-UN force that would include major US units in its ranks.

i. In April 1982, the United States joined with several other Western powers to establish a Multinational Force (MNF) in Beirut to oversee the evacuation of Palestine Liberation Organization guerrillas from Lebanon. As with the establishment of the MFO, the MNF came into being out of a combination of disunity in the United Nations and Israeli preference for a non-UN force. The MNF withdrew in August, only to return as MNF II the following month when internal instability led the Lebanese government to seek its return.

j. The operation in Lebanon is an example of how peacekeeping can become a major problem for a superpower. The United States engaged in what it thought was a peacekeeping operation, but because there was no agreement between the parties involved, and because the United States became directly involved in the dispute, the US units were no longer peacekeepers. The Marines of MNF II remained in Beirut until February 1984, and the last MNF II contingent (France) left Lebanon in March 1984.

k. The United States will continue to support UN peacekeeping efforts, when, in the US view, they can contribute to the maintenance of international peace and security. This support will probably range from political-negotiation and votes in the Security Council to financial and logistical support of the operation. United States participation may also include military units, or it may be limited to assigning individuals to observer groups.

I-3. PEACEKEEPING PRINCIPLES. The importance of peacekeeping in the control of conflict in a dangerous world cannot be overemphasized. It differs fundamentally from internal security in that a peacekeeping force does not act in support of a government. It is entirely neutral. Once it loses its reputation for impartiality, the usefulness of the force is destroyed. There are certain conditions that must be present in order for peacekeeping operations to work well. These conditions are:

- a. Consent of the belligerents.
- b. The political recognition of the peacekeeping operation by most if not all of the international community.
- c. A clear, restricted, and realistic mandate or mission.
- d. Sufficient freedom of movement for the force, or observers, to carry out their responsibilities.
- e. An effective, command, control, and communications (C<sup>3</sup>) system.

f. Well trained, balanced, impartial, non-coercive forces.

g. An effective and responsive all-source intelligence capability.

#### I-4. PLANNING CONSIDERATIONS.

##### a. Political Factors.

(1) It is important to understand how political factors influence the tactical execution of peacekeeping operations. Specifically, rules of engagement (use of force), freedom of movement, and area of operations are mandated by the political process. Often, political restrictions limit the military commander in the conduct of his mission. The tactical commander must comply with instructions and inform the chain of command of the tactical implications of a political decision. Political and military leaders must understand each other's perceptions and problems.

(2) The peacekeeping mission will operate with a mandate which will describe the scope of operations for the mission. The sponsoring bodies usually consist of several countries. Although these countries are supposed to be impartial, each may have its own idea of what the peacekeeping force should do. Also, the agreement should frame the mandate for the peacekeeping force in such a way that it gives advantage to no side. For these reasons, the agreement may be imprecise and susceptible to different interpretations by the belligerent parties and all those countries contributing to the force as well.

(3) Still another political factor involves the rules of engagement (ROE). The ROE must be clearly stated in simple language. The two principal rules are minimum use of force and total impartiality. The use of deadly force is justified only under situations of extreme necessity (typically, only in self-defense), and as a last resort when all lesser means have failed to curtail the use of violence by the parties involved.

(4) A consideration in planning for US participation in a peacekeeping operation is the question of fiscal responsibility. The United Nations has depended on contributions of member nations or voluntary contributions to meet its fiscal obligations. The United States has provided supplies and transport at no cost to the United Nations, but it may not do so in the future. There must be consideration of the policy implications if the United States decides not to provide support to a UN peacekeeping operation because of fiscal constraints.

(5) The initial set of facts and assumptions may change. Based on these new facts and assumptions, adjustments must be made that may lead to the withdrawal of the peacekeeping force.

b. Guidelines. To plan a peacekeeping operation a planner should consider political factors, force structure, command and control, reinforcement/rotation, maintenance and supply of equipment, emergency withdraw plans, weapons policy and rules of engagement, public affairs policy, morale and welfare support, the use of technology, and force protection.

(1) The difficulties of joining a multinational force in a hostile environment, in unfamiliar territory and with restrictions on one's freedom of action, may be overcome if commanders study the history and lessons of previous peacekeeping operations and anticipate the kinds of problems they may have to face in a new operation. Force mandates, which lay down the principles governing the conduct of operations, will necessarily vary to meet the circumstances peculiar to each operation. There are a number of guidelines that apply to the conduct of a peacekeeping force in all situations:

(a) All members must understand what the peacekeeping force is trying to do.

(b) All members must be fully briefed on the political and military situation, the customs and religions of the people, and be kept up-to-date as the situation changes. They must make every effort to get to know the people and to understand their problems with the aim of achieving a reputation for sympathy and impartiality.

(c) Peacekeeping personnel necessarily maintain a high profile, and consequently, their lives may be continually at risk. Commanders must balance the need to maintain a confident presence with due provision for the safety of their troops.

(d) Because quick and crucial decisions which may affect the reputation of the force, the success of the mission, and the safety of the peacekeeping troops, may be necessary, a detachment likely to face a difficult situation should have an officer present.

(e) All units must enforce uniformly the policy on rules of engagement and the action to be taken with regard to infringements and violations of agreements. In operations where units have used markedly different standards in executing the rules, there has been trouble with the parties to the dispute and constant friction as well as recrimination between the national contingents of the peacekeeping force.

(2) In peacekeeping, quite small incidents have serious political repercussions. Seemingly trivial events can escalate rapidly into major crises and calls for emergency meetings of the Security Council. Although there are great advantages in dealing with problems at the lowest possible level, to nip trouble in the

bud, senior commanders and force headquarters must follow the smallest incident with interest and may have to intervene at an earlier stage than is customary in normal military operations.

(3) Centralized control ensures a uniformity of reaction to incidents and may prevent precipitate action by inexperienced peacekeepers. However, no superior commander can foresee every eventuality or predict how incidents may develop. The commander must allow a measure of initiative to junior leaders within the general framework of force policy directives and standard operating procedures.

(4) Subordinates must keep their superiors fully informed of situations as they develop and suggest possible courses of action in sufficient time for their superiors to evaluate them and give directions as necessary. If a subordinate anticipates a serious crisis in time, a superior commander, even the force commander, may go to the scene to take charge himself. However, there will be occasions when an incident develops so quickly that the subordinate on the spot must take the most sensible course of action immediately rather than allow an ugly situation to get out of hand. It is essential that he reports what he has done and the reasons for his actions as quickly as possible.

#### c. Technology.

(1) Technology can assist substantially in the conduct of peacekeeping operations. The missions may involve extended distances or restrictions that can be reduced by technology. Some of the useful systems are:

- (a) Intelligence fusion systems.
- (b) Effective countermine equipment.
- (c) Effective night vision equipment.
- (d) Communications systems.
- (e) Surveillance systems.
- (f) Lightweight body armor.
- (g) Accurate ground maps. —
- (h) Modular tactical force protection equipment.

(2) Early in the planning process, commanders must give consideration to the use of such technology as sensors to provide better surveillance or perform other key peacekeeping roles. For example, the Sinai Field Mission successfully incorporated a wide range of sensors to continuously monitor key terrain.



**d. Estimate of the Mission Environment.**

(1) A modified form of intelligence preparation of the mission area is necessary to assist in the planning of a peacekeeping operation. The analysis should include an analysis of the conflict and the parties to the dispute, the civilian population, the host nation, a terrain analysis, and weather analysis.

(2) It will assist the peacekeeping force to understand the nature of the conflict they are being sent to help halt. The military capabilities of the parties to the conflict will also be necessary.

(3) An awareness of the population, its culture, language, politics, religion and what the peacekeepers might expect from the population (i.e., support, indifference, hostility) will be helpful.

(4) Knowledge of the situation in the host nation, its government, military, and facilities available to support the peacekeeping force is essential.

(5) An analysis of the terrain in the peacekeeper's area of operations, including such items as the location of roads, airfields, the nature of the terrain, and the environment is very important.

(6) A thorough knowledge of climate conditions, as well as the usual evaluation of short duration weather forecasts, is important. In areas of great seasonal climatic change, intelligence produced during one season may be practically useless in other seasons. Therefore, weather and terrain intelligence must be available and reviewed by the peacekeeping force to ensure its current applicability.

**e. Force Structure.**

(1) A review of the force structure of all UN peacekeeping operations shows a heavy preponderance of infantry-type units, augmented by support personnel. The standard size unit deployed is a battalion, a logical decision in light of the fact that the battalion is the smallest, fully-staffed, self-contained unit. Light infantry forces, with minimal augmentation, are organized, equipped, trained, and suited for the conduct of peacekeeping operations. The mission, as explained in the mandate, determines the exact augmentation and composition of an inserted unit. For example, a unit has little reason to take mortars or anti-tank weapons when conducting an observer mission.

(2) The strength of the force depends upon its mandate and the size and nature of the area it has to control. At one end of the scale United Nations Disengagement Observer Force (UNDOF) has only two battalions and an authorized strength of 1,450 to supervise a narrow buffer zone in open country on the Golan Heights between two states which wish to maintain a cease-fire, even though one of them does not wish to conclude a peace treaty. At the other end of the scale United Nations Interim Force in Lebanon (UNIFIL) requires seven battalions and an authorized strength of 7,000 to attempt to control a large area of operations in broken, mountainous country in the midst of numerous warring factions.

(3) Normally only small arms and light machine-guns are included. Light and medium mortars are used primarily for illumination.

(4) The main combat arm component is the infantry battalion, which can hold positions, provide a continuous presence and observation, man checkpoints, interpose units, and patrol. Armored reconnaissance units, whose mobility, communications, and ability to provide numerous patrols with armored protection against stones, small-arms fire, and grenades, are particularly useful when the situation is fluid and embraces a large area. Air detachments can provide evidence of infringements of cease-fire and arms limitation agreements. Their presence to assure the near certainty to detect violations provides a deterrent to major infringements and so enhances security. Such a deterrence encourages an atmosphere of confidence among the disputants that all parties will abide by the agreement.

(5) The United States may provide a wide variety of personnel and/or equipment in support of peacekeeping operations. United States contributions will likely be limited to the provision of materiel, financial support, and/or observers. Military units and individuals may be available for peacekeeping force missions or to provide functional support to an international force, e.g., intelligence, communications, and airlift/sealift.

(6) A peacekeeping force must be task organized to accomplish the mission. The force structure must be the result of an in-depth, assessment of the mission environment that considers the political realities of the country. Where clashes in urban areas may give rise to insurrection, the peacekeeping force must have a structure to meet such a requirement. It may be given broad police powers. If border clashes between regular forces of disputing parties are the prime threat to renewal of violence, the peacekeeping force must have the appropriate structure, strength, and designated area of control to deter the disputing parties. In this case the appropriate structure may be

one of overpowering military strength capable of defending itself. Thus, the basic force structure and appropriate augmentation are dependent on the particular situation. Language qualifications and the use of liaison parties also require consideration when task organizing forces. Other force structure considerations are:

(a) To ensure the force is large enough to defend itself and establish a visible presence.

(b) To make the force flexible enough to concentrate forces in response to a local threat.

(c) To see that, within the force, no one national element is normally dominant over the others.

f. Force Protection.

(1) Although security may seem inappropriate to peacekeeping, an avowedly open type of operation, it is just as important as it is in many other military operations.

(2) Terrorism poses serious problems for the peacekeeper. Suppressive action involves a political judgment, because the man who is labeled a terrorist by one side may be hailed as a freedom-fighter by the other. The peacekeeper's tools of overt observation and the interposition of forces are impotent. Only police or special operating forces are effective, and their use by a peacekeeping force is normally unacceptable to a host government. It would make the peacekeepers part of the local problem, and peacekeeping troops would offer vulnerable retaliatory targets. Countering terrorism is outside the scope of a peacekeeping operation.

(3) The importance of not passing on information concerning the deployment, positions, strengths, and equipment of one side to the other deserves special emphasis. Peacekeepers must be neutral. If one side suspects that the peacekeeping force, either deliberately or inadvertently, is giving information to the other, the peacekeeping force will face accusations of espionage, and one or both parties to the dispute may become so uncooperative as to jeopardize the success of the operation.

(4) To prevent charges of espionage, the control of photography is necessary in the area of operations. No one should take photographs of either side's positions, and cameras must not be displayed near them.

(5) Commanders must show the same concern for the security of arms and ammunition as is usual military operations. Groups are always on the lookout for carelessly guarded weapons.

(6) Commanders should take precautions to protect positions, headquarters, and accommodations. They should take care to guard against spectacular attacks with mines, car bombs, and mortars. If possible, buildings which are easy to approach undetected should be avoided, and the number of men billeted in any one building should not present an attractive target to terrorists. The manifest neutrality and even-handedness of a force ensures that it does not become a target for needless hostility and in themselves affords a measure of protection. However, a force must always remain on its guard against the possibility of attack by extremist groups.

(7) A peacekeeping force is vulnerable to security risks through its own personnel in three ways:

(a) Peacekeeping forces have no means of checking local employees. To guard against the possibility that these employees' governments, or illegal organizations, may bribe or pressure them to obtain information on politically sensitive matters, or on the opposite side's forces, commanders must exercise great care when discussing peacekeeping force affairs and handling documents in the presence of local nationals.

(b) Officers, secretaries, communications personnel, and other key personnel are in possession of much sensitive information about the local political situation, host nation deployments, commercial contracts, and financial matters. These people are known to the host governments and to terrorists who may attempt to compromise them to obtain information.

(c) Commanders should see that those who routinely visit the host nation on duty receive briefings on the risk. They should be under the surveillance of an effective security element.

I-5. TYPES OF PEACEKEEPING ROLES. There are three methods of US involvement in peacekeeping operations. They are support, observer missions, and peacekeeping forces.

a. Support.

(1) Logistical/financial support is the predominate form of US support to international peacekeeping operations, especially to UN sponsored peacekeeping. United States support includes financial support for equipment and contingents from other countries that will actually conduct the operations. For example, some observers are paid by the country that supplies them. In other cases, the United Nations pays the costs. It is important for the United States to be able to capture the costs for airlift, sealift, logistics, and spare parts. It may be cheaper, in some cases, for both the United States and the United Nations to contract for commercial services.

(2) Logistical support may take the form of US equipment and supplies and sealift/airlift of equipment and supplies to support a peacekeeping operation.

b. Observer Missions.

(1) Individual US military members may perform a wide variety of functions in support of peacekeeping. These functions include acting as individual observers under the command of the United Nations or some other organizations, or to provide individual expertise in such functional areas as communications, logistics, medical, administration or other functional support as required.

(2) Observers assist in the observance and maintenance of a cease-fire, investigate and report incidents, carry out inspections, conduct patrols, witness the handing over of persons and/or property from one party to another, participate in rescue or search missions and perform such other duties as evacuation and convoy-escort.

(3) Observers, by their presence, are often sufficient to deter breaches of cease-fire and armistice agreements. Their work is apt to be monotonous but rewarding. Their up-to-date and impartial reports provide useful evidence and help eliminate the paralyzing claims and counterclaims put forward by partisan interests. Observer missions are particularly useful to verify the provisions of demilitarized zone and arms limitation agreements.

c. Peacekeeping Forces.

(1) The United States may decide to participate in a peacekeeping operation by providing military units. Units may include naval, air, or ground force units, or a combination of all of these. Types of unit support may include communications, logistical, medical, engineer, military police, or combat arms units.

(2) Peacekeeping forces may consist of combat or combat support units in a peacekeeping role, with additional logistic and communication units under a joint headquarters.

## CHAPTER II

### ESTABLISHING A PEACEKEEPING OPERATION

#### II-1. ESTABLISHMENT OF A PEACEKEEPING OPERATION.

##### a. Mandate.

(1) The Security Council will normally pass a resolution calling upon the Secretary-General to report back to the Security Council on his negotiations to create a peacekeeping force and draw up a mandate. The Secretary-General will return to the Security Council to report the results of his negotiations with the parties to the dispute, including the host country and states which are both potential contributors of contingents and acceptable to the host nation. Specifically the report will:

(2) Nominate the force commander and ask for the Council's approval.

(3) Recommend the size of the force.

(4) List those states which are prepared to provide contingents immediately and those with which negotiations are still proceeding.

(5) Outline proposals for the movement and maintenance of the force, including states which might provide transport aircraft, shipping and logistical units.

(6) Propose an initial time limit for the operation.

(7) Make recommendations as to the financing of the force.

b. Principles Governing Control of a Peacekeeping Operation. The following principles govern the deployment and employment of United Nations peacekeeping forces. To be both acceptable and effective the force must:

(1) Have the full confidence and backing of the Security Council.

(2) Be international in composition and able to operate as an efficient, integrated organization.

(3) Enjoy the assent and full cooperation of the host states. This is a legal necessity.

(4) Be under the control of the Security Council through the Secretary-General.

(5) Enjoy complete freedom of movement in the area of operation.

(6) Be allowed the immunities and privileges necessary to its function.

(7) Act impartially and avoid actions which could prejudice the rights, claims or positions of the parties concerned.

(8) Only use force in self-defense.

(9) Be supplied and administered under arrangements made by the United Nations to insulate the force from external pressures.

(10) Ideally, be funded by all member states in accordance with their ability to pay on a scale determined by the General Assembly.

c. Tasks. The functions of a peacekeeping operation are laid down in the Secretary-General's report as approved by a Security Council resolution. Essentially they will be determined by the nature of the operation and try to:

(1) Prevent the recurrence of fighting.

(2) Contribute to the restoration of law and order, and a return to normal conditions.

(3) Secure the withdrawal of unauthorized armed elements.

(4) Establish a security or buffer zone between the hostile forces and keep the parties to the dispute out of it.

(5) Replace the occupation of minority enclaves by the stronger side with United Nations protection.

(6) Allow a United Nations constabulary to police those villages with mixed populations which are located outside the buffer zone in potentially hostile territory.

(7) Effect liaison with United Nations military observers working alongside the force to verify arms limitation agreements in areas adjacent to the buffer zone.

d. Duration. A peacekeeping force's existence is authorized for limited periods for the following reasons:

(1) The Security Council wishes to maintain a firm control for political reasons.

(2) Contributing and host countries are wary of accepting open-ended commitments.

(3) Contributing countries, and in cases where all members of the United Nations pay a share of the force, they too wish to maintain financial control.

## II-2. LEGAL STATUS.

a. The legal status of a peacekeeping force, its military/civilian personnel, and property, must be secured by a legal instrument with the host government. The type of agreement depends on the degree of accord between the states in the dispute and with the United Nations, or any non-United Nations controlling body. In Cyprus, a large measure of accord is reflected in a status of forces agreement (SOFA) which has the standing of a treaty. When such close harmony is not attainable, a memorandum of understanding or an exchange of letters may come into being. An exchange of letters may be made directly between governments in the case of non-United Nations forces or unilaterally and in parallel between the host governments and the United Nations. The agreement balances two fundamental factors: the independence of the UN forces versus the governmental authorities of the host government and freedom of movement.

b. The legal instrument between the United Nations and the host nation covers the peacekeeping force's rights, privileges, immunities, jurisdiction, and status including:

- (1) Authority over force premises.
- (2) Displaying the United Nations or force flag.
- (3) Dress and uniform for the force.
- (4) Carrying of arms.
- (5) Freedom of movement in the area of operations.
- (6) Peacekeeping operations.
- (7) Identification of personnel, vehicles, ships, and aircraft.
- (8) Marking of peacekeeping force positions and premises.



(9) Economic relations between the peacekeeping force and its individuals, on the one hand, and the host state and its citizens, on the other hand.

(10) Use of communications, the postal service, roads, waterways, port facilities and airfields.

(11) Use of public utilities (water, drainage, electricity, gas, etc).

(12) Cooperation between peacekeeping force police and host nation police.

(13) Immunity from search and inspection of force documents.

(14) Provision of supplies and services from the host nation.

(15) Employment of local labor.

(16) Settlement of disputes and claims.

(17) Liaison.

c. Military and civilian personnel of a peacekeeping force remain under the criminal jurisdiction of their own nations, and the legal instrument should provide for the handing over of members of the force from the host government to their respective contingents for disciplinary action. The parties must make specific arrangements for dealing with motor accidents, on or off duty. While members of a peacekeeping force enjoy a considerable measure of protection, even when off duty, they must respect the laws, regulations, and religions of the host nation and refrain from all political activity.

d. Identification.

(1) United Nations Peacekeeping Forces. All members, vehicles and positions must be clearly marked.

(a) Personnel. Blue helmet liner or blue beret with United Nations badge, blue brassard or armband, shoulder patch, blue scarf and identity card. If time permits, the United Nations will make a partial issue of items of dress before the contingent leaves its home base. United Nations identity cards will be issued on arrival in the area of operations. Arrangements should be made to obtain four passport photographs for each individual before departure.

(b) Vehicles. Every vehicle must display a United Nations flag and have the Organization's insignia painted on it in accordance with the force regulations. Vehicles will usually be painted white.

(c) Patrols. Dismounted patrols must carry a United Nations flag. Force regulations may order that it should be lit at night.

(d) Positions. All headquarters, military and domestic installations, observation posts, checkpoints, road blocks and positions must be very visible, usually painted in white, fly the United Nations flag, and have insignia painted prominently on the walls. If there is an air threat, it should be painted on the roofs. Positions should be illuminated at night.

(e) Demarcation Lines. Lines separating forces must be clearly and suitably marked.

(2) Non-United Nations Peacekeeping Forces. These will conform broadly to United Nations practice except that they will use their own colors and insignia. Previous and current non-UN peacekeeping forces have used the following:

(a) Multinational Force and Observers (MFO), Sinai. Terracotta berets, white helicopters and vehicles. Observers wear orange overalls and hats.

(b) Multinational Force (MNF), Beirut. Each contingent displayed its national flag on its vehicles.

### II-3. USE OF FORCE.

a. The use of unnecessary or illegal force undermines the credibility and acceptability of a peacekeeping force to the host nations, the participants in the dispute and within the international community. It may escalate the level of violence in the area and create a situation in which the peacekeeping force becomes part of the local problem. It is necessary that the use of force should be carefully controlled and restricted in its application. Peacekeeping forces have no mandate to prevent violations of an agreement by the active use of force.

(1) The passive use of force employs physical means which are aimed not to harm individuals, installations and equipment. Examples are the use of vehicles to block the passage of persons or vehicles and the removal of unauthorized persons from peacekeeping force positions.

(2) The active use of force employs means which results in physical harm to individuals, installations and equipment. Examples are the use of batons, rifle butts, and weapons fire.

b. If force has to be used as a last resort, much will depend on how well commanders and staffs have considered likely scenarios and prepared themselves and their troops to meet such a contingency. Planning should be influenced by the following guidelines:

(1) Firmness. The will and the ability to use force in the last resort are essential if a peacekeeping operation is to survive hostile threats and the use of force.

(2) Preliminary Warning. At an early stage of a force's deployment, the parties to the dispute should be informed, in general terms, of the circumstances in which the peacekeepers might be obliged to use force and of their warning procedures. They should also be warned of the risks of escalation should either of the parties allow an incident to get out of hand.

(3) Anticipation. Intelligent anticipation based on good information will often permit a timely deployment to a threatened area before the danger becomes serious. If a situation develops in which force is likely to be employed, the way in which it is to be used should be planned as thoroughly as possible.

(4) Passive Force. If the sector troops are deployed in sufficient strength and obviously in control of the situation the use of passive force to block movement may be sufficient.

(5) Combined Action. Should it appear that the sector troops may be unable to contain the situation, the prompt arrival of a reserve representative of all the national contingents will demonstrate collective determination and discourage further aggressive action. Speed is achieved by good planning and rehearsal as well as by anticipation.

(6) Defensive Positions. Positions must be reconnoitered, prepared for occupation, and covered by obstacles. They must include shelters to protect troops from shell, mortar and rocket fire when the situation warrants it. Their occupation must be rehearsed.

c. All troops must be briefed on arrival in the area of operations on the following points and kept up-to-date on:

(1) The potential threat.

(2) Closing checkpoints to prevent entry into the buffer zone.

(3) Deployment to positions.

(4) How to act in foreseeable emergencies when force may have to be used.

d. The use of active force is permissible only as a last resort in self-defense. As a guide, the following constitute grounds for self-defense:

(1) When the safety of an individual or part of a force is in jeopardy.

(2) When one of the parties to the dispute attempts to use force to compel a withdrawal from a position occupied under orders from its commanders, or to infiltrate and envelop such positions as are deemed necessary by its commanders for them to hold, thus jeopardizing their safety.

(3) When attempts are made to disarm members by force.

(4) When attempts are made to arrest or abduct peacekeeping force members, civil or military.

(5) When a violation by force against peacekeeping premises takes place.

(6) In the face of resistance to attempts by forceful means to prevent the peacekeeping force from discharging its duties.

e. Clear warning of the intention to use force must be given by the following procedure:

(1) Warn the party to halt, or cease aggressive action, by shouting the word "halt" in the local language.

(2) If necessary, repeat the warning, and cock the weapon.

(3) Repeat the warning a third time.

(4) Fire warning shots, provided that innocent bystanders are not endangered.

(5) If the warnings are disregarded and the aggression continues, open fire with single shots, using the minimum number required.

(6) Apply first aid to the casualties and evacuate them.

(7) Notify headquarters immediately by radio, collect the names of witnesses, recover the spent cartridge cases and prepare a full written report.

f. The peacekeeping force may use only the minimum amount of force to stop the threat to life or the aggressive violation. As soon as the attack or violation ceases, fire must be ceased. In circumstances where a peacekeeping force is subjected to serious attack, it may be necessary to use support weapons. In such cases the force commander might delegate authority to use these to the commander on the ground. If a resort to force is necessary it must be an impartial application and not only be applied impartially but seen to be used impartially.

#### II-4. RECONNAISSANCE, MOVEMENT, AND ASSEMBLY.

a. As soon as US participation in a peacekeeping force appears likely, an advance party, including communication and logistic elements, should be prepared to be sent to the area of operations. However, these will not arrive until the mandate has been approved by the Security Council, the United Nations Secretariat has made an official request for a contingent, and the US Government has given its approval. Even before the mandate has been agreed to, the Secretariat will probably take the following action:

(1) Warn the force commander and arrange for the assembly of an ad hoc headquarters, probably from the United Nations military observers in the area.

(2) Establish communications between the area of operations and UN Headquarters in New York before the force commander arrives.

(3) Establish communications and a liaison machinery between the force headquarters and the parties to the dispute.

(4) Convene a coordinating conference at UN Headquarters under the chairmanship of the Office of the Under Secretaries-General for Special Political Affairs and attended by representatives of the troop-contributing states. Ideally, the contingent commanders should be present, but this may not be practicable. The information the US representative will be required to provide at this conference will include:

(a) Proposed organization and strength of the contingent.

(b) List of supplies and equipment which the United States cannot provide.

(c) Load details for the air and sea movement of the contingent if national resources are not to be used.

(d) Location to which UN clothing and insignia should be sent.

(e) Postal address in the United States, or elsewhere, to which the contingent's mail should be sent.

(f) Copy of preferred ration issue.

(5) Size and earliest possible date of arrival of the contingent reconnaissance and advance parties at the host nation's air and sea ports, on the assumption that the force mandate will be approved.

(6) If the United States is to provide the air and sea lift for its contingent, the movement control staff and technical backing requirement to supplement the host nation's resources at the nominated air and sea ports will be required.

b. As soon as the mandate is approved the force will, ideally, assemble in the following order:

(1) Force commander and headquarters elements.

(2) Reconnaissance and advance parties from combat arms and logistic units movement control detachment.

(3) Establishment of a transit camp from elements of the advance parties to assemble contingents as they arrive, marry them up with transportation and dispatch them into the area of operations.

(4) Force commander's legal, political, and administrative advisors.

(5) Balanced build-up of contingent combat arms and logistic units.

c. Because contingency planning for peacekeeping operations is politically unacceptable, there is bound to be some improvisation when a new mission is established. Contingency planning for other possible operations will be useful, but standard air movement tables may have to be revised because of restrictions on the size of the units and heavy weapons. The appropriate mix of combat, communications and logistic units can only be decided in the light of the United Nations requirement at the time. Movement to the area is likely to be a national responsibility, and the US Air Force may be asked to provide transportation for contingents from smaller nations. Because an international force may not complete deployment for weeks or even months, a contingent should be logistically self-sufficient until the force maintenance area is built up.

## **II-5. FINANCING PEACEKEEPING OPERATIONS.**

a. While the authority to establish a peacekeeping operation lies with the Security Council, the power to authorize both the ordinary expenditure of the United Nations and the extraordinary expenses of peacekeeping lie with the General Assembly. However, the Soviet Union has always contended that because only the Security Council has the right to decide on matters relating to the maintenance of peace and international security, the financing of peacekeeping is reserved to the Council also. In cases in which the Soviet Union disagrees with the setting up of an operation, or some aspect of it, but does not carry its opposition to the point of using the veto in the Security Council, it has refused to contribute funds. Other states, including the United States, occasionally take the same attitude.

b. There are two methods of funding UN peacekeeping operations: assessed contributions and voluntary contributions. In the past, the United Nations has sent out bills to each member and, in addition, has received voluntary contributions to support peacekeeping efforts.

(1) Assessed Contributions. Under the authority of Article 17 of the UN Charter, peacekeeping operations are paid for by all members of the United Nations on a scale worked out to take account of their ability to pay. Even this arrangement is difficult for the poorer countries, especially when two or more forces are operating simultaneously. The General Assembly's Advisory Committee on Administrative and Budgetary Questions' solution has been to reduce the poorer nations' assessments in the hope that the richer nations, in particular the five permanent members, will increase theirs. This has not worked well because countries frequently refuse to pay. The deficit can only be made up by the funding by the nations providing contingents, or by the host nation, or by voluntary contributions from other members. Article 19 provides for the forfeiture of the vote in the General Assembly by any member which falls 2 years in arrears in its assessed contributions. The United Nations has never exacted that penalty, however, because of the fear of mass withdrawals of the disenfranchised nations from the United Nations.

(2) Voluntary Contributions. A force may be financed entirely by voluntary contributions in order to avoid a veto on its establishment. These costs are met by the states contributing the forces, the host nation, and if the General Assembly so authorizes, by empowering the Secretary-General to accept any voluntary contributions other members may wish to make. The latter are never sufficient, however, with the result that the United Nations undergoes a financial crisis whenever the mandate is due for renewal. Inevitably, the main burden falls on the members providing contingents and the host nation.

c. Personnel receive pay and allowances through the normal national channels. Depending on the financial arrangements for the force, some of the allowances may be recoverable through the United Nations or its multinational equivalent.

d. The billing for a peacekeeping force is complicated. Some expenditures are recoverable through the United Nations or equivalent organization and some are not. The items are seldom the same for any two forces. In order that billing may be possible, the peacekeeping forces must keep very careful records and accounts.

## II-6. POLITICAL DIRECTION AND CONTROL.

### a. United Nations Sponsored.

(1) Peacekeeping evolved out of a functional necessity to control conflict without incurring a veto in the Security Council rather than from any express direction embodied in the Charter. However, in general terms, peacekeeping is an operation involving military personnel, without powers of enforcement, established by the United Nations or some other group of states to help restore and maintain peace in an area of conflict.

(2) There is no general agreement on what constitutes an authority for peacekeeping. The Soviet Union has not recognized the competence of the General Assembly, although the United Nations has launched two operations under its aegis, the United Nations Emergency Force I and United Nations Temporary Executive Authority established for the transfer of West Irian to Indonesia. While the Soviet Union's argument that Chapter VII of the Charter is the only legitimate authority, other powers maintain that peacekeeping operations are based on the general authority of the Security Council. Article 29 of the Charter allows the Security Council to establish such subsidiary organs as it deems necessary for the performance of its functions. Observer missions and peacekeeping forces come within the context of this article.

(3) United Nations peacekeeping forces are under UN control, vested in the Secretary-General, and they are responsible to the authority of the Security Council. This arrangement recognizes the key role of the Security Council in establishment of a peacekeeping operation, while it allows the Secretary-General some flexibility and discretion in implementing Security Council resolutions.

(4) The Security Council is thus the authority for mandating and terminating United Nations peacekeeping operations and for deciding on a force's task, although the General Assembly may do so in rare circumstances. The Secretary-General is responsible to the Council for the organization, conduct and



direction of the force, and he alone reports to the Council about it. He keeps the Council fully informed of developments relating to the functioning of the force and, under the guidelines established in October 1973, he also informs on all matters which might affect its nature or effectiveness so that the Council can make a decision, if it wishes.

(5) Recognizing the Secretary-General's need for some latitude and flexibility in his day-to-day dealings with a peacekeeping force, the United States is prepared to allow him a measure of discretion within the terms of the force's mandate. The majority of the members of the Council prefer this approach.

(6) The United States participates in UN peacekeeping operations in accordance with Public Law 72-264 (United Nations Participation Act of 1945). When the decision is made by the appropriate political authority for the United States to support a UN sponsored peacekeeping mission, the following procedures must apply:

(a) The US Mission at the United Nations (USUN) consolidates requests for support and submits those requests to the Bureau of International Organizations (IO) at the US State Department. Those requests that involve DOD support either logistical, individual observers, or units will be coordinated through the Assistant Secretary of Defense for International Security Affairs (ASD/ISA) to the Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff (JCS). The Chairman of the JCS selects an appropriate Joint Staff Directorate to be in charge of organizing the necessary support.

(b) The designated Joint Staff Directorate will form a joint action cell to develop written taskings and coordinate these taskings with the Unified Commanders (CINC's), Services and other agencies.

(c) The Department of Defense will designate a CINC or Service to be Executive Agent for the peacekeeping operation. The Executive Agent provides administrative, personnel, operational, logistics, intelligence, and command, control, and communications support for committed US military forces. It may also assist forces of other nations when such support is in accord with diplomatic agreement.

(d) The Executive Agent also publishes terms of reference (TOR) to govern the implementation of US participation in the peacekeeping operation. The executive agent develops TOR from an analysis of the mandate and the situation. The TOR may be subject to approval by the parties to the dispute. These TOR describe the mission, command relationships, organization, logistics, accounting procedures, coordination and liaison, and responsibilities of the US military units and personnel assigned

to or supporting the peacekeeping force. These terms of reference are often far less precise than is desirable from a military point of view. The belligerents reach agreement on the mandate and truce, because it is politically expedient for them to do so. They will have different and hidden agendas and may use a peacekeeping operation to achieve their own advantage. They may also interpret the TOR to suit their own purpose. This point is important to understand because the peacekeeping force may find itself unavoidably deployed in an unclear situation, but political reasons require it to be there and define the framework for operations.

(e) The CINC or Services will then coordinate the desired support and inform the joint action cell of those actions. The JCS will reply to ASD/ISA, which in turn notifies the State Department. The CINC or Services then will implement the taskings.

(f) United States military units designated to participate in a peacekeeping operation are usually placed under the operational control of the commander of the peacekeeping force upon entering his area of responsibility. Operational command of such US military units is retained by the appropriate Unified Command Commander as recommended by the Executive Agent and approved by the Joint Chiefs of Staff. Commanders of the US military units under the operational control of the peacekeeping force commander retain command of their subordinate or attached elements.

b. Non-United Nations Sponsored.

(1) The United States may participate in peacekeeping operations outside the United Nations with regional organizations or unilaterally. Peacekeeping operations depend on the consent of the parties to the dispute, the host nation, and also on the agreement of other powers which perceive that their interests may be affected. Consequently, the United Nations is not always an acceptable or practicable sponsor of peacekeeping operations. The decision to conduct these operations will be made by the appropriate political authorities. Within the US State Department, the appropriate regional bureau will coordinate desired support with ASD/ISA. The procedures used within DOD and JCS to develop specific tasks and coordinate actions with the services would be the same as those of a UN sponsored peacekeeping mission.

(2) Reasons for the United States to participate in a peacekeeping operation outside the United Nations are:

(a) Lack of agreement in the UN Security Council that would lead to one of the five permanent members to veto the establishment of the operation. Any one of the five permanent

members may block action with a veto in order to protect its interests. After the Camp David Agreement and the White House Treaty sealed the peace between Israel and Egypt, other Arab states persuaded the Soviet Union to threaten a veto of any United Nations role in carrying out the Treaty when United Nations Emergency Force II's mandate expired in July 1979. On the initiative of the United States, and with support of the British and French, the Multinational Force and Observers (MFO) was formed after Israeli withdrawal from the Sinai in April, 1982, to replace UNEF II with an organization outside the aegis of the United Nations. The multinational organization has been successful, largely because Israel and Egypt wanted peace, and it was in the West's interests to preserve it.

(b) The attitude of Third World states toward a UN peacekeeping force would favor another international organization to sponsor the effort. While the emergent nations often find a United Nations peacekeeping force a useful and convenient means of controlling a dangerous local dispute, they also have reservations. Some African nations regarded the UN operation in the Congo as a thinly disguised western interference and have favored the Organization of African Unity as a sponsor for peacekeeping.

(c) The UN Charter recognizes the right of regional organizations to deal with such matters relating to the maintenance of international peace and security as are appropriate for regional action, provided that such arrangements or agencies and their activities are consistent with the purposes and principles of the United Nations.

(3) To be successful, a peacekeeping operation outside the United Nations must have:

(a) The support of a superpower, a regional organization, or a multinational group.

(b) A properly constituted political organization through which policy directives, finance and administrative matters can be coordinated and channeled to the force commander. This may be a regional organization, or a director-general, such as the MFO's in Rome. A committee of ambassadors obtaining separate instructions from their own governments may be necessary in an emergency to launch an operation, but it should be replaced by an organization tailored to the requirement as soon as possible.

(c) A designated military commander with an integrated headquarters. This can be a joint task force provided by a CINC.

(d) The consent of the parties to the dispute and of the host countries, and preferably enjoy wide enough international support, or at least tacit acceptance, to avoid damaging interference.

(e) Adequate guaranteed financial support.

## II-7. UN FORCE HEADQUARTERS.

a. The force commander is appointed by the Secretary-General with the consent of the Security Council. He is responsible to the Secretary-General. While the force commander conducts day-to-day operations with fairly wide discretionary powers, he refers all policy matters to the Secretary-General. Force commanders are selected from those nations which habitually contribute peacekeeping forces and whose nationality is acceptable to the Security Council. Mostly they come from the Nordic countries and non-aligned states but members of alliances are not excluded. The force commander must be acceptable to the host nations and other parties to the dispute.

b. The size of staffs must be closely controlled both on grounds of economy, because the General Assembly will attack any alleged extravagance when voting on a force's budget, and because host nations are suspicious of large operations and information staffs. The need for economy clashes with the requirement to provide the contributing nations with prestigious positions. Although the official languages for most forces are English and French, the ability to speak other languages may be a factor in selection. When an observer group has a mission in a peacekeeping force area of operations, some of the force headquarters staff which require a depth of knowledge of the region and its problems, e.g., information and liaison, may be reserved for observers. Such an arrangement may help to eliminate another problem, the shortness of staff officer tours, often only a year in some peacekeeping force headquarters. The Nordic countries' UN Staff Officers' Course produces officers specifically trained to man UN force headquarters staff positions. There is no standard staff organization common to all United Nations force headquarters. Minor differences reflect local requirements or the predilections of the officers who created the headquarters. The staff is grouped into three main categories: Force Commander's Personal Staff, Military Staff, and Civilian Staff.

(1) The force commander's personal staff normally consists of military assistant, political advisor, legal advisor, public affairs officer, and liaison officers from the armed forces of the parties to the dispute.

(2) The military staff normally consists of Chief of Staff, Deputy Chief of Staff, and an Operations Staff (information, plans, training, engineer, communications, air traffic control, security, police operations, observer groups, and administrative and logistics).

(3) The civilian staff in a peacekeeping force is provided by the United Nations Secretariat in New York. The Chief Administrative Officer (CAO) is responsible for the direction of all administrative matters having financial implications as well as for the overall direction of the force's administration. The CAO is responsible to the force commander and deals directly with the Office of Field Operational and External Support Activities (OFOESA) at United Nations Headquarters, New York.

## II-8. MILITARY COMMAND AND CONTROL.

a. The following command relationships are established:

(1) The most effective command relationship is one which has one commander and one force headquarters responsible for the peacekeeping operations. National contingents report directly to the Force Commander. However, the US Force Commander ultimately is responsible for supervising and coordinating the accomplishment of his mission, communicating changes in the mission, and responding to committed units' needs/requirements. The best method of accomplishing this type of peacekeeping operation is to let the Unified Commander in whose area of responsibility the operation is to take place to plan and organize the operation and provide the necessary command and control.

(2) A contingent comprises a nation's entire contribution, units and its staff officers on the force headquarters. On operational and logistic matters, the force commander has full command authority with the exception of such purely national administrative matters as assignments and discipline. The force commander has a general responsibility for the good order and discipline of the force and may make investigations, conduct enquiries and call for information, reports and consultations. The national contingent commanders are responsible for disciplinary action within their own contingents in accordance with their national codes of military law. In the event of a major disciplinary breach, which brings a contingent into disrepute and detracts from its usefulness as a peacekeeper, the force commander will discuss the case with the contingent commander and may refer the matter, through the Secretary-General, to the troop-contributing government concerned.

(3) The force commander and his staff deal directly with unit commanders. Contingent commanders are not necessarily unit commanders, and in cases in which they are not, they act in an advisory capacity and are not part of the operational chain of command. When large peacekeeping forces are spread over a wide area, it may be necessary to require the addition of a brigade or joint task force headquarters.

b. Non-UN sponsored operations may be set up in a number of ways. The choice will largely depend on the time available and political factors, such as the attitude of the superpowers and the willingness or ability of the parties to cooperate. The way operations may be set up include:

(1) A single headquarters specially created to coordinate both political and military activities. This may be a joint task force set up by a CINC.

(2) A headquarters to control military operations with political direction coming from a separate political source.

(3) An ad hoc arrangement.

c. The force commander's directive will make it clear if any person other than himself, such as the deputy force commander or the chief of staff, is empowered to give orders to contingents and in what circumstances; e.g., the deputy when the force commander is absent or a nominated commander when a detachment is set up. A unit commander must be assured orders he receives have the authority of the force commander and, through him, the sanction of the Secretary-General. As a corollary, a unit commander cannot accept orders from other sources, whether they come from the host nation, parties to the dispute, or from his own government, except in the limited sphere of discipline and matters of domestic concern. The only exception may occur in a non-UN force when national contingents are placed directly under their own governments or their ambassadors to the host nation.

d. Commanders of peacekeeping forces must understand the nature of peacekeeping operations and their effects on the members of the command. Some considerations include:

(1) Avoid escalating the rank of negotiation, it is a job for Lieutenants and NCO's.

(2) Avoid spoiling your troops with supplies not available to the other contingents as this could cause problems. Take what the United Nations provides.

(3) Once fighting starts shift emphasis to humanitarian duties.

(4) Be careful in the selection of personnel for the force; not everyone is suited to peacekeeping duty.

(5) Immediately remove personnel who become too familiar with one of the parties to the dispute. Maintain contact equally between both sides.

#### II-9. COORDINATION.

a. Liaison between the peacekeeping force, the host nation, and the parties to a dispute is important at all levels from force headquarters down to company and sometimes even platoon. At force headquarters, there may be such a formal liaison system, as that which exists in the MFO, Sinai, where problems are discussed and violation reports are passed to the Egyptian and Israeli governments through their respective liaison systems.

b. Coordination is achieved by a system of conferences chaired by the force commander or his chief of staff. The conferences are not held by every peacekeeping force currently in existence, but each has a method to disseminate information and policy.

## CHAPTER III

### OBSERVER MISSIONS

#### III-1. OBSERVATION.

a. Observation is a technique common to all peacekeeping operations. It is the peacekeeper's primary responsibility and basic requirement. The observer will observe and report what he is specifically told to monitor within his area of observation. He provides timely and accurate reports on any suspicious situation, incident, or occurrence.

b. Observation requires comprehension of both the facts and their implications. The observer should pass information to the next higher echelon without delay. Successful peacekeeping depends on impartial, factual reporting accompanied by as much pertinent data as possible, e.g., maps, field sketches, diagrams, photographs (if permitted), and references to specific agreements or instructions.

c. The role of a military observer is to man observation posts in pairs, each member of the pair coming from a different country in a UN mission. When working in the same area as a peacekeeping force, they man separate observation posts. Observers carry out such additional tasks as the conduct of vehicle patrols in sensitive areas, the conduct of local negotiations between rival forces, and special investigations. The observers remain under command of their parent observer organization for personnel administration. Observer groups usually operate under an open-ended mandate which can only be terminated in the case of a UN operation by the Security Council. Typical observer missions include:

(1) Handling of alleged cease-fire violations and/or alleged border incidents.

(2) Observing and reporting upon alleged violations.

(3) The conduct of regular liaison visits to formations and units within their area of responsibility.

(4) The continuous check of forces within their area of responsibility and the reporting of any changes thereof.

(5) The maintenance of up-to-date information on the disposition of forces within their area of responsibility.

(6) Periodically visiting forward positions in order to observe and report upon the disposition of forces.

(7) Reception of aircraft at airfields and supervision of the loading and unloading of the aircraft.



d. At all times military observers must be completely impartial and objective, and they should avoid any action that might give rise to doubts about their ability to remain so. For this reason, a military observer should have neither family ties nor other close ties with individuals or organizations in the countries in the mission area.

e. When no observer group is working under the operational command of a peacekeeping force, the force must be able to meet all its observation requirements both to watch and report on the activities of the parties to the dispute in the area of the buffer zone, the area of separation, or, where there are no such zones, the area of operations. Force observation posts are normally manned by a squad or less under the command of a junior noncommissioned officer, and their role is confined to observing and reporting.

f. Observers shall exercise the utmost discretion with respect to all matters of official business. They shall not communicate to any person any information known to them by reason of their official position which has not been made public, except in the course of their duties or by authorization of higher authority. Nor shall they at any time use such information to private advantage. Observers are not generally authorized to carry arms at any time.

g. In UN operations, observer missions are usually established separately from peacekeeping forces, but when they operate in the same area, they will function closely together. Observer missions are unarmed. Their observation posts are manned exclusively by officers. Their administration in the field is provided by the force under whose operational control they function. The organization as a whole, including the command of observer groups not deployed under the operational control of peacekeeping forces, is supervised by a general officer called Chief of the Observer Group, not force commander. Officers manning each observation post are never of the same nationality. The military observer's main task is to provide observation over an area of operations requiring UN surveillance and to inspect, at regular intervals, areas of limitation of forces and armaments to check that the agreed troop strengths and the numbers and categories of weapons are not exceeded. Observers may also be given a wide measure of discretion in negotiating low-level problems between the opposing parties.

h. The following are the types of observation posts:

(1) The location and type of every observation post is authorized by the peacekeeping force commander or by the chief of staff of an observer mission when the latter is operating on its own. Changes in status must also be authorized by these authorities.

(2) Those posts, manned on a 24-hour basis, are known as permanent observation posts or observation points. Except when observer mission posts are located away from a force, they should be close to support and protection. Such posts have radio and landline installed on a permanent basis. The posts must be clearly marked with the force flag and insignia painted on the walls and roof. A permanent post will only be abandoned with the force commander's authority or when the battalion sector commander considers the lives of the observers to be uselessly in jeopardy.

(3) A post to which observers may be sent to provide coverage by day or overnight to meet some special requirement is considered a temporary post. It should have a telephone landline established. Radios and telephones will be installed only when the post is manned. Temporary observation posts will be marked in the same way as permanent posts and should be protected by ready force positions.

(4) Former permanent or temporary observation posts are posts which are no longer required for the purpose for which they were originally established but are retained either to maintain a peacekeeping presence or in case they may be required to meet an unforeseen contingency. The telephone line is usually removed and, in the event of reoccupation, the observation posts' party will have to rely on radio. The post is marked with the force's insignia and flies its flag to maintain a presence.

(5) All observation posts, permanent, temporary or unmanned, are allotted a serial number or name. If the post is abandoned, the number or name is not used again to avoid confusion. In the case of numbered posts, the designation usually identifies the type, the sector in which it is located and its serial number. Observer mission posts are usually given names to distinguish them from neighboring peacekeeping force observation posts.

i. The following are the duties in an observation post:

(1) In a peacekeeping force an observation post is usually manned by a squad. This provides sufficient manpower for observation, rest, some recreation and, in the last resort, defense.

(2) Observation posts will observe, verify, if possible, and report:

(a) Movements of the military forces of the two sides. Should this involve unit identifications and other information of a sensitive nature, the observation post commander will record the time of the sighting and send the report by secure means, vehicle or helicopter.

(b) Shooting, hostile acts, or threats made against the peacekeeping force or civilians.

(c) Improvements to the defensive positions of the two parties.

(d) Overflight by service or civil aircraft when air movement in the buffer zone or area of separation has been restricted.

(e) Violations of the armistice agreement until the cause of the violation has been removed or rectified.

(f) All events will be recorded in the logs kept at the observation post and its controlling headquarters. The log provides the evidence for protests and for reports.

j. When coming on watch in an observation post, each man is to:

(1) Obtain a thorough briefing from the man on watch on all recent activities.

(2) Read the observation post logbook.

(3) Ensure that all items on the observation post equipment checklist are accounted for and in working order.

(4) Conduct a radio and telephone line check before the old watch leaves.

(5) Count live ammunition carefully; the new observer should see every round. This check may provide vital evidence in the event of a shooting incident.

k. Force headquarters will normally give guidance on the extent to which observation posts are to send patrols out to investigate incidents or to move to an alternative position to get a better view. The policy for the dispatch and control of patrols sent from observation posts to investigate incidents may be laid down in force standard operating procedures or remain at the discretion of unit commanders.

**III-2. SURVEILLANCE AND SUPERVISION.** Surveillance and supervision are operation-specific techniques. They help to ensure implementation of agreements. Surveillance is the conduct of observation and is the technique used to conduct observer missions. Supervision is the act of observing the compliance by the parties to the dispute with the agreement. Surveillance and supervision require restraint, tact, and patience.

a. An observer mission is concerned with monitoring the following:

- (1) Cease-fire and armistice agreements.
- (2) The establishment and supervision of buffer and demilitarized zones.
- (3) The supervision of armament control agreements when this is not the responsibility of an observer group.
- (4) Military deployment limitations.
- (5) Military withdrawals, disengagements, and the return of territory.
- (6) Border infiltration and arms smuggling.
- (7) Prisoner of war exchanges.
- (8) Freedom of movement agreements for civilian farmers working in restricted zones. Farmers who can establish a claim to the ownership of land in a restricted area may be permitted to farm in daylight up to the median line in the buffer zone. The median line should be marked by a clearly definable feature, such as a track, a line of boundary stones or landmarks.
- (9) Refugee camps.
- (10) Plebiscites and elections.

b. The following are aids to surveillance:

- (1) During daylight the whole line or zone should be kept under observation.
- (2) By night the area should be kept under surveillance as far as possible by night observation devices and radar. Sensitive areas may be covered by electronic and acoustic devices.
- (3) When the presence of an intruder is detected, white light or illumination may be used with advantage to confirm the sightings and warn the intruder that he has been spotted. This in itself has a deterrent effect. Care must be taken not to direct searchlight beams across the buffer zone boundaries to illuminate the parties' cease-fire lines. Searchlights fitted with dispersion screens may be used to floodlight areas up to 100 meters without risking an infringement of the agreement near the edge of the buffer zone.

(4) Patrols, both foot and vehicle mounted, may be used to supplement observation and investigate incidents. They must maintain radio contact with their base and always be easily recognizable as peacekeeping troops.

(5) All incidents must be logged and reported to sector and force headquarters.

III-3. INVESTIGATION OF COMPLAINTS. The peacekeeper's ability to make a thorough and objective investigation and a fair assessment may determine whether fighting resumes and tensions increase. It will enhance the impartial image of the peacekeeper in the minds of the antagonists. Inevitably, evaluations of complaints which favor one side do not please the other. If the peacekeeper is fair, objective, and consistent, the antagonists may grumble, but they will respect and accept the peacekeeper's judgments. The peacekeeper should always remember that there are two or more sides involved, and that it is his duty to listen to all sides before making a decision.

#### III-4. ADDITIONAL TASKS.

a. Changing circumstances may require the peacekeeper to undertake additional tasks. These can include clearing mines, marking defined forward limits of each side's military forces, and seeking and receiving the remains of belligerents killed in action.

b. Mines or unexploded ordnance may litter the area after opposing forces have withdrawn. Mine clearing may then become a priority for peacekeeping forces.

(1) Considerable quantities of anti-tank and anti-personnel mines laid by both sides remain in the area when the opposing sides withdraw after a conflict. It is unusual for either party to make their minefield records available to the peacekeeping force, even if they kept any. Too often the minefields were badly marked, or not marked at all, to the danger of the peacekeeping force and civilians living in the area.

(2) The minefields in an area still belong to the party who laid them. In theory they remain as part of their obstacle plan should the peacekeeping force withdraw. The peacekeeping force is obliged not to give away the positions of one party's minefields to the other, although it will have to ensure that they are adequately marked. It follows that the peacekeeping force is not permitted to lift the parties' minefields, except to destroy or remove mines and unexploded ammunition which offers a hazard along roads in use by the force and civilians living in the area.

(3) All minefields must be recorded and fenced off using the standard minefield markers attached to a two-strand barbed wire fence. Members of a peacekeeping force should familiarize themselves with the minefield marking methods used by the opposing parties.

(4) In peacekeeping forces, engineer officers are nominated as force and sector minefield recording officers. Their duties are to maintain the master minefield map at force headquarters covering the entire area and minefield maps in each sector. They are responsible for carrying out periodic inspections of the minefield maps, records and the marking of the minefields themselves.

(5) When a new minefield is discovered, a warning is immediately displayed in the area, and a report is made through the sector operations and minefield recording officers to their superiors at force headquarters. The force minefield recording officer will activate a minefield recording team to reconnoiter and mark the area.

(6) Up-to-date minefields maps will be disseminated to force headquarters, sector headquarters, force reserve headquarters, military police, and civil police, if working with the peacekeeping forces. Up-to-date minefield maps will be maintained by the force minefield recording officer covering the entire area and sector minefield recording officers covering their respective sectors.

(7) Explosions in either the host nation's territory outside the area or in the area itself will be reported through sector headquarters to the operations staff at force headquarters. Explosive devices or mines discovered in the area outside marked minefields will be reported to force headquarters for explosive demolition action. In the meantime they will be marked and arrangements made to warn force personnel and civilians who might approach them.

c. The recovery of remains is a normal part of any disengagement mission. Peacekeepers should appreciate the delicate nature of the operation and respect relevant religious customs and rites. Searches for remains require careful planning and discussion with all involved parties.

III-5. OBSERVER TECHNIQUES. The peacekeeper needs to cultivate a built in mental mechanism which ensures that his capacity for being vigilant and alert does not diminish with time. The peacekeeper needs to be alert and vigilant at all times, both on and off duty, since it may well depend upon his observation reports whether or not a crisis situation is avoided. These techniques can aid an observer in the accomplishment of his mission.

**a. Observation on static duty:**

(1) The peacekeeper should devise his own system of mental activity, using a variety of simple processes involving mind training exercises.

(2) When on duty in an observation post, he can change position from time to time so as to obtain a different angle of sight over his arc of observation.

(3) Divide his arc of observation into sub arcs and alternate from one to another during the period of observer duty.

(4) He should watch out for anything unusual, particularly changes in the physical occupation of the area, i.e., subjects/objects normally present now missing or present where they were not before. It is important to record anything that is different.

(5) Note and respond to any changes or differences in the behavioral patterns of people working in the area from day to day.

(6) Mentally record the numbers of animals in a flock/herd, the number of people working at any time in the fields, the number of vehicles and their types that pass through or are parked in the arc of observation during his tour of duty. In many cases of complaint and allegations of abduction, theft and interference such information can be valuable.

(7) Complete a sketch of the area to include the whole arc and record on it everything that happens within the arc of observation during his tour of duty, including the smallest items. The sketch can be utilized as a diary of events.

(8) As an essential alternative to keeping a sketch, maintain a log of events and record everything.

(9) Avoid at all times daydreaming or fretting over personal problems.

**b. When traveling around the operational area of the force/mission in the course of performing his duties a peacekeeper should:**

(1) Be constantly observant.

(2) Note down any circumstances, incidents or activity which appear unusual or of any significance.

(3) Be inquisitive--ask questions when they are judged necessary, but always in a diplomatic and friendly manner, not aggressively. However, caution must be exercised for self-protection by unarmed observers.

(4) Vary the traveling route wherever possible to intensify interest and alertness and widen the area of observation.

(5) Observe and record any remarks or comment relevant to the situation or occasion. Be overt in behavior. Do not act as a spy.

(6) Record conversations immediately after they have occurred and when the content is fresh in his mind.

(7) Report observations at the end of the journey and/or upon return to base or headquarters, and provide a copy to the appropriate duty officer.



## CHAPTER IV

### PEACEKEEPING FORCES

IV-1. GROUND FORCES. The preponderance of peacekeeping operations will be conducted by US Army or US Marine Corps ground units or individuals. Types of units that could be involved include headquarters units, combat arms, communications, military police, transportation, supply, medical, maintenance, and engineer.

#### IV-2. TASKS AND MISSIONS.

a. The tasks normally assigned to a peacekeeping force can be summarized under the following general headings:

(1) Separate the opposing sides and at the same time establish a buffer zone.

(2) Supervise a truce or cease-fire agreement.

(3) Prevent an armed conflict between nations or within a nation.

(4) Contribute to the maintenance of law and order and a return to normal conditions.

b. In order to accomplish the assignments as outlined above it would, as a rule, be necessary to establish and deploy military peacekeeping units and observer groups in a demilitarized zone or a buffer zone between the opposing forces. This would enable a force to:

(1) Exercise control and surveillance of an area or boundary and demarcation line between the opposing parties.

(2) Prevent infiltration within the area or a confrontation between the opposing forces.

(3) Complete the separation of the opposing sides so as to establish a buffer zone.

(4) Direct local negotiations between the parties concerned.

c. In addition to the above, the assignment may also involve a certain surveillance of the opposing forces' military and paramilitary units within a specified zone in order to ensure:

(1) Permitted units are not increased above the strength stipulated by the parties involved.

(2) Existing fortifications are not reinforced or enlarged.

(3) There is no increase of arms and supplies apart from those agreed upon.

(4) The Armistice Demarcation Line (ADL) or the buffer zone are not overflowed by aircraft from the opposing sides.

d. The methods involved in the accomplishment of a mission may include the following activities:

(1) Observation.

(2) Patrolling.

(3) Traffic control.

(4) Surveillance of sensitive areas.

(5) Preventing or dispersing prohibited demonstrations.

(6) Checking on transportation of goods.

(7) Searching for missing persons.

(8) Negotiation with local authorities.

(9) Logistical support to isolated ethnic groups.

#### IV-3. PEACEKEEPING FORCE MISSIONS.

a. Disengagements. While observer groups have been immensely useful, the scope for unarmed observation has limits. To separate the armed forces of hostile states in conflict, the additional authority of an organized body of armed troops is required, but such a body must be one which operates with the consent of both parties and with restraint. A peacekeeping force may be deployed for a simple interposition operation and subsequently be used to develop a system of buffer zones and areas of limitations in armaments, or to supervise a withdraw from occupied territory.

b. Cease-fires. Interposition is the normal means used by a peacekeeping force to secure the withdraw of opposing forces behind lines agreed to by both sides. It may provide the first stage in the negotiation of armistice demarcation lines and progress towards understandings on buffer zones and arms limitations agreements.

c. **Buffer Zones.** Buffer zones are also known as areas of separation, they are established by obtaining the agreement of one or both hostile parties to withdraw in order to create as wide a neutral space as possible between them. Cease-fire lines, marked and usually fenced or wired on either side of the buffer zone, indicate the agreed forward limits of the contending forces. The cease-fire lines are observed, patrolled and perhaps occupied by the peacekeeping force. Additionally, an observer group may man observation posts of its own. Access to the buffer zone will normally be restricted to the peacekeeping force and observer group but special arrangements may be negotiated to allow farmers to cultivate land to which they can establish ownership up to a median line, usually marked by a patrol track and often fenced. Access is controlled at checkpoints manned by the peacekeeping force and usually restricted to the hours of daylight.

(1) **Cease-fire Line (CFL).** The lines mark the positions occupied by the troops of the opposing sides at the suspension of hostilities. Of necessity ad hoc, they are often contentious and the subject of complaint wherever one side is left in possession of an important tactical or political feature. Moreover, the former combatants may not only dispute each other's CFLs, they may not even accept the peacekeeping force's interpretation of the cease-fire agreement as to where their own CFL runs. For a peacekeeping force to disclose the position of one party's CFL to the other would be considered a breach of confidence.

(2) **Armistice Demarcation Line (ADL).** The agreement of cease-fire lines may pave the way for the establishment of a buffer zone and the withdrawal of an invading force. At some stage the parties may agree to an armistice demarcation line, perhaps leading eventually to a formal peace treaty.

(3) **Lines Demarcating a Buffer Zone or Area of Separation (AOS).** There is not always agreement on the location of the lines of a buffer zone or AOS, because the parties to the dispute do not use the same map grid, or because one side refuses to give up a position near the line which it considers essential to its security. A buffer zone or AOS is normally only a demilitarized zone (DMZ) from which the armed forces of both sides are excluded. However, the zone is the sovereign territory of at least one of the parties whose rights of administration the peacekeeping force must recognize. That party may still police the area.

(4) **Marking.** These lines must be marked by wire fences and posted with signs wherever possible.

d. **Areas of Limitation in Armaments.** The next step after the establishment and consolidation of a buffer zone may be the negotiation of areas of limitation of armaments on either side of the buffer zone. The usual arrangement is for the two sides to agree on equal numbers of small, lightly armed forces in the areas immediately adjacent to the buffer zone. In the areas beyond, larger forces will be allowed, the agreement laying down an upper limit for the number and type of formations, tanks, anti-aircraft weapons and artillery, by caliber, permitted in each area.

e. **Supervised Withdrawal.** The withdrawal of a combatant from occupied territory and its reoccupation by the forces of the state to whom it belongs can be achieved by an agreement to move sectors of the buffer zone successively towards the original border in such a way that peacekeeping troops always interpose between the two sides. Sections of the buffer zone are in turn evacuated by the withdrawing forces' troops and occupied by peacekeeping troops. The original buffer zone is then handed over by the peacekeepers to the reoccupying force. The process can be repeated as often as necessary.

f. **Areas of Operations.** There are occasions when a buffer zone may be inappropriate or when political agreement cannot be reached to create one. It may then be necessary to have the peacekeeping force operate over a large geographic area without clearly defined zones or lines from which to conduct their operations.

#### IV-4. NAVAL PEACEKEEPING OPERATIONS.

a. Naval involvement in peacekeeping operations may take the form of sealift, surface forces, marine amphibious forces, or individuals.

b. The open sea beyond a coastline provides a near equivalent of a prohibited border zone on land, and comparatively simple controls within territorial waters can simplify the problem of identification. The degree of physical protection necessary depends on the ease with which operatives can make landings. A rugged coastline with inaccessible cliffs and treacherous offshore currents obviously needs less observation than an easily-approached one with wide beaches offering good exits to the interior. Observation and surveillance of an indented coastline is difficult, and peacekeeping forces must make use of surveillance devices and reconnaissance.

c. The naval component will establish liaison with other commanders for collecting and sharing reconnaissance information. Reconnaissance information must be disseminated immediately to all affected commands.

d. Surveillance. Naval surveillance is the systematic close and continuous observation of selected air, surface and/or subsurface areas, specifically to detect and identify aircraft, vessels or forces. The purpose of surveillance is to provide early warning of potentially hostile activities.

(1) One of the most difficult problems of surveillance is distinguishing contacts of agreement violators from the total number of contacts present. Sufficient assets may not be available to conduct all desired surveillance operations. The naval component commander must prioritize surveillance requirements and make shortfalls known to the overall peacekeeping force commander. Surveillance requirements can be simplified by controlling movement of friendly traffic, operating an identification system, or exploiting resources outside the naval component. In some cases, merchant and fishing vessels may be organized into an effective supplemental reporting system.

(2) Surveillance operations planners must consider the nature of the mission, the capabilities of available surveillance assets, the geography of the area being watched, and the environment in the target areas. It may not be possible to survey the entire area where the parties to the dispute may be operating. The total area must then be divided into smaller surveillance areas and these smaller areas prioritized for surveillance operations.

e. Interdiction.

(1) Interdiction is an action taken to intercept, divert, disrupt, or delay one of the parties in the dispute from violating the agreement. Immediately upon discovery of an unidentified target, cognizant authority will direct action to identify and, if so indicated, interdict that target. In all cases, appropriate rules of engagement apply.

(2) The naval component commander is responsible to interdict hostile or potentially hostile surface targets in the assigned area of responsibility. Surface interdiction within a naval coastal area may be accomplished by surface or air assets assigned to the naval component.

f. Coastal Sea Control. Coastal sea control is the employment of forces to ensure the unimpeded use of an offshore area. Coastal sea control is accomplished by conducting surveillance and interdiction operations.

g. Protection of Offshore Assets. Offshore assets are primarily petroleum production platforms and deepwater offshore port facilities. These assets are vital not only because of their gas and petroleum production but also for their potential use as remote heliports, surveillance platforms, and logistics support bases.

h. Harbor Defense/Port Security. Harbor defense/port security is the protection of harbor approaches, harbors, anchorages, ports, vessels, waterfront facilities and cargoes. Harbor defense measures include surveillance, interdiction, port security and vessel movement control. Port security is protection from accidents, negligence, civil disturbance, sabotage, and disasters. Port security includes port safety. Both are closely related, mutually supportive, and often conducted concurrently.

i. Countermines. Mines are a concern for all naval peacekeeping efforts. Mine countermeasures is a specialized area designed to ensure access to or transit of oceans and waterways. Mine countermeasures includes all means used to prevent or reduce the danger to surface ships and submarines from mines.

(1) Mine hunting locates individual mines so that actions may be taken to avoid, remove, or destroy them.

(2) Minesweeping is covering a region of water by traversing it with either mechanical sweep gear to sever the moorings of moored mines or by producing influence fields which satisfy the firing mechanisms of influence mines.

j. Search and Rescue. The purpose of search and rescue is to recover distressed personnel in a threatened environment. It is conducted to preserve, and return to duty, manpower resources of the United States and other parties.

#### IV-5. AIR OPERATIONS.

a. An air component is added to all peacekeeping forces. It is particularly useful in the difficult and undeveloped terrain where forces are often deployed. United States Air Force contributions to peacekeeping can be in the nature of airlift, logistics, surveillance, reconnaissance, command, control, and communications, intelligence, and aerial refueling.

b. A single air commander should control all air peacekeeping elements to facilitate the utilization of these assets by the overall peacekeeping command headquarters.

c. Surveillance. United States Air Force elements can be utilized to provide surveillance of cease-fire and armistice lines, military deployment limitations, military withdrawals or disengagements, and civilian movement in and out of disputed areas and demarcation lines. Air Force assets are also useful to provide electronic surveillance of the belligerent parties.

d. Reconnaissance. The objective of airborne reconnaissance is to collect information from airborne, orbital, and surface-based sensors that can provide a means to observe a cease-fire without being overt. Surveillance operations collect information continuously from the aerospace, and from the Earth's surface and subsurface. Reconnaissance operations are directed toward localized or specific targets. Through surveillance and reconnaissance such varied data as, meteorological, hydrographic, geographic, electronic, and communications are obtainable. Strategic and tactical surveillance and reconnaissance provide timely notification of hostile intent.

e. Air Traffic Control. The United States may also provide air traffic control in support of the peacekeeping effort. This support could range from providing liaison personnel for host country facilities to the employment of mobile tower and navigational aid and landing systems.

f. Intelligence. Aerospace forces can acquire, correlate, analyze, and supply intelligence data that can be essential to decisionmaking, because it can provide an assessment of actions that may occur and reduces the risk of surprise and enhances operational effectiveness.

g. Aerial Refueling. It enables the refueling force to assist in the rapid deployment and employment of peacekeeping forces and to provide logistical support to peacekeeping forces of the United States and other peacekeeping forces.

#### IV-6. DEPLOYING A PEACEKEEPING FORCE.

a. There are two ways of deploying a peacekeeping force:

- (1) Permanent allocation of national units to sectors.
- (2) Rotation of national units within the force.

b. Permanent Allocation to Sectors.

(1) Units build up a depth of knowledge of the community and the terrain in their respective sectors. Continuity is an advantage in the collection and processing of information.

(2) Useful relationships are built up with the local authorities of the host government, the police, and the leadership of the contending parties.

(3) Peacekeepers become well acquainted with the local forces and are able to recognize military personnel of the opposing forces who attempt to pass through checkpoints dressed as police or civilians.

(4) Pride in the maintenance and improvement of positions and quarters. If men know that they build for themselves and their national successors, whom they are likely to meet later on, they will show more interest and take more care.

(5) The disadvantage is the risk that national contingents will develop their own interpretation of force policy in their sectors. Marked differences of approach in the past have led to charges of inconsistency against the peacekeeping force. Additionally, habitual contact may lead to continued animosity with the belligerents.

(6) In a newly established force there is sufficient activity to interest personnel (establishing positions and observation posts, separating hostile forces, and perhaps supervising a withdrawal and the hand over of territory). It is when the force is well established, the opposing sides appear to have accepted the status quo, and the troops are watching a buffer zone in a seemingly quiet environment that boredom and lassitude may set in.

#### c. Rotation Within the Force.

(1) All national contingents obtain a working knowledge of more than one area. This may be useful if it is necessary to reinforce a threatened sector. It provides consistency in dealing with incidents and problems. Troops are kept on their toes.

(2) Should friction develop between a contingent and a party to the dispute, or should relations become too cozy, it may be advantageous to switch a contingent to a different sector.

(3) There is one disadvantage which is the lack of time to acquire any depth of knowledge of the area, of the local authorities, and of the contending parties and personalities. Much of this useful background information may not be passed to the relieving units.

(4) There may be major upheaval for units which are usually on comparatively short peacekeeping tours. As there is no standard length of tour common to all peacekeeping forces, rotation might present difficulties.

(5) Less interest and care in the maintenance and improvement of positions and quarters may occur.

(6) Rotation may also bring about additional expenses, an important consideration when funds for peacekeeping are hard to come by.



**d. Permanent Allocation to Sectors.**

(1) Units are best left in situations where they can exploit the benefits of continuity with regard to becoming well acquainted with their sectors and personalities. Handing over both the accumulated information records of a sector and its positions is easier when the relieving unit is of the same nationality.

(2) Boredom is less of a problem when tours are short. The average length of tour is 6 months. The best antidote to boredom is good, imaginative leadership.

(3) The commanders of armored reconnaissance units and reserves must become familiar with the entire area of operations. They must emphasize knowing the likely trouble spots and alternative routes open to them so that they can issue orders, deploy, and operate with speed and efficiency in a crisis.

**e. Integration.**

(1) When there is serious trouble, it is necessary to prevent undue political and military pressure from falling on any one national contingent. The burden for taking essential but possibly unpopular action should fall as evenly as possible upon the force to demonstrate political solidarity and equal commitment and to avoid the victimization of any one contingent.

(2) To achieve this, a force mobile reserve is formed on a contingency basis with mobility being the key advantage, the reserve is often grouped around an armored reconnaissance squadron of two or three infantry platoons. As it is desirable to represent all the national contingents contributing infantry to the force, the platoons may be composite in nature composed of sections from different contingents. The aviation, communications, and logistic support element will form in a similar manner from the appropriate contingents.

(3) In order that such a multinational and multilingual force can operate effectively, it must train together periodically. While the mobile reserve commander and his subordinate officers must reconnoiter likely crisis points with discretion, they should perform training where it is unlikely to alarm the local population and the parties in dispute. The national elements of the mobile reserve will normally live with their parent units.

#### IV-7. DIRECTIVES.

a. Basing their concepts on the force mandate and the force commander's directive, subordinate unit commanders will issue their own directives. The contents will depend on the situation peculiar to each force. Some of the subjects that commanders directives should cover are:

(1) The unit commander's own authority for his appointment as a peacekeeping unit commander by the force commander.

(2) The unit commander's appointment of subordinates, especially those detached from the main body, as commanders.

(3) The unit commander's directive may not be possible to produce at the beginning of a sudden emergency. The relationship between commanders at each level must be made quite clear from the outset.

b. The directive explains the degree of command and control the Force commander has over national contingents by covering such topics as:

(1) The power of the Force commander to direct operations.

(2) The applicability of national laws to apply to discipline and national regulations to personnel within contingents.

c. Tasks the directive should describe:

(1) Sub-unit areas of responsibility and tasks.

(2) Method of operation and deployment.

(3) Reserve.

(4) States of readiness.

d. Although these details will have been negotiated between UN Headquarters, or the non-UN force authority, before the contingent's deployment they will be repeated in the unit commander's directive which includes: -

(1) A description of the composition of the unit.

(2) Duration of duty.

e. Status of the Force is the legal basis on which the force operates. Because these matters affect the sovereign rights of the host government, they will be negotiated by the Secretary-General, laid down in the force commander's directive, and repeated in unit commander's directives. It explains:

(1) The relationship with the host government and its local administration, armed forces, and police.

(2) Powers of search and seizure and rights of entry into property.

f. In addition to the force commander, who is authorized to issue instructions and directives to the unit and under what circumstances.

g. Normally reports on all matters which concern the operation of a peacekeeping force are submitted to the force commander or his staff. Reports on operations are not normally sent by units or contingents to their own governments unless there is a major disagreement on a matter which would require a commander to deal directly with his/her own government.

h. Relations with local forces and liaison with mediation missions.

i. Location of unit headquarters.

j. Regulations and restrictions to be observed off duty.

k. Relations with the media and circumstances when information on operational and domestic matters may be given to the press and through whom.

l. Security.

(1) Against possible attacks.

(2) Security of information.

m. Identification. Wearing of UN or non-UN identification headdress, badges, armbands, and the marking of vehicles and positions.

n. Special administrative requirements.

#### IV-8. STANDARD OPERATING PROCEDURES AND REPORTS.

a. Standard Operating Procedures (SOPs) are required to regulate the conduct of operations and logistics for a force of mixed nationalities. Their drafting and issue will be one of the first duties of a force headquarters on arrival in the area of

operations. Relevant extracts of TOR, ROE, and commander's directives will be repeated in unit SOPs, as well as any other matters the unit commander wishes to add which are consistent with peacekeeping force policy. It is not possible to prepare SOPs in advance of an operation, because each operation is in many respects unique and hence requires particular points of guidance.

b. Each force and mission has their own formats for routine, situation reports and these are supplemented by special report forms for particular incidents. On joining a peacekeeping force or observer mission, the unit or individual will receive the appropriate SOPs, which include the proper styles and formats.

#### IV-9. PATROLLING TECHNIQUES.

a. Patrolling is a key factor in most peacekeeping operations. If it is well planned and executed, it can achieve important tactical advantages for the peacekeeper. To be fully effective, patrols need freedom of movement and observation. Restrictions on patrolling, if any, need clarification when peacekeeping force agreements are drafted. Patrols, either foot, ground vehicle, air, or naval, have a combination of four tasks: information-gathering, investigating, supervising, and publicizing a presence.

b. Patrolling may be confined to daylight hours in areas in which armed confrontations continue to occur. When limited visibility makes identification difficult, the two opposing sides may be nervous and apt to fire without hesitation. Even so, the peacekeeping mandate may require the commander to send out patrols in these conditions. The procedures and ground rules under which patrols operate must be clearly defined and known by all, including the opposing armed forces.

c. Patrols may be organized to supplement the information provided by observation posts in a buffer zone or area of separation. In large areas of operation where the ground cannot be covered by observation force static observation posts it may be necessary to patrol periodically to ensure that breaches of the agreement are discovered and rectified before they acquire a legitimate status by default.

d. Patrols are dispatched to take a closer look at activity, which an observation post has reported and which may infringe an armistice agreement.

e. Patrols which are designed to separate the parties in an actual or potential confrontation are called "interposition patrols." They are sometimes called "standing patrols." Such patrols cease to operate when the situation returns to normal.

f. The usual aim of escort patrols is to protect farmers, or others, on their way to and from work where the route passes dangerously close to a hostile party.

g. "Supervisory patrols" are sent to ensure that action which has been agreed between the peacekeeping force and one or both of the parties to a dispute is carried out and completed.

h. The mere presence of a peacekeeping patrol, or the likelihood that one may appear at any moment, deters potential breakers of an armistice agreement. The presence of peacekeeping troops in a tense situation has a reassuring and calming effect in troubled areas.

i. Peacekeeping patrols should enjoy complete freedom of movement. In practice, the contending parties sometimes impose restrictions that are written into the status of forces agreement and which must be scrupulously observed. Such caveats are usually concerned with perceived threats to the security of one of the signatories.

j. Patrols may be on foot, mounted in vehicles or undertaken by light aircraft or helicopters. Patrolling must be overt and by day if at all possible. A patrol must be easily recognizable. Its members must wear distinctive items that clearly indicate they are members of the peacekeeping force. Vehicles must be painted in the colors of the force and show its insignia prominently. The peacekeeping flag must be carried by a foot patrol and displayed by all vehicles in a mounted patrol. If it becomes necessary to operate by night, a patrol must use lights, carry an illuminated peacekeeping flag, and move in as open a manner as possible. Failure to do so arouses suspicion, leads to unnecessary misunderstandings, and risks a shooting incident.

k. Patrol Responsibilities.

(1) Check the methods of identification agreed to and used by both parties and any police working with the peacekeeping force. Ensure patrol members are carrying personal and force identity documents.

(2) Check any restrictions imposed by the status of forces agreement or other negotiations.

(3) Notify neighboring peacekeeping force units, and observation posts of the patrol plan. Check the necessity or advisability of notifying the parties to the agreement.

(4) Ensure that maps carried on patrol are unmarked. Memorize positions. A patrol should always include a member who knows the area well.

(5) Ensure that orders covering procedures for dealing with intruders into the buffer zone are thoroughly understood.

(6) Log all observations and events. Memorize details for sketch maps. Do not make a map on patrol if there is the smallest chance of being stopped by one of the parties to the dispute.

(7) Maintain continuous radio contact with the patrol base and report the progress of the patrol.

(8) Record any violations of agreements, changes in deployment, or variations in civilian activity or attitudes.

(9) Do not deviate from the planned route without reference to higher authority.

(10) Action on challenge by the contending parties should be halt, establish identity, and report incident over the radio.

(11) Do not surrender weapons, maps, logs or radio without the permission of higher authority.

(12) Be alert but avoid any display of aggression. If the forces or the population on either side wave, return the greeting.

(13) Be impartial.

(14) Report or confirm any significant observations immediately to the debriefing officer.

(15) Mark maps or draw field sketches immediately upon return. Marked maps and logs provide the basis for the investigation of incidents and the lodgement of protests.

1. Personal weapons are carried by members of a peacekeeping force performing operational tasks:

(1) Manning observation posts, checkpoints, liaison posts, defensive positions and standing patrols.

(2) Patrols, mounted or on foot.

(3) Escort duties.

(4) Vehicle guards and convoy escorts.

(5) When charged with the safe custody of peacekeeping force property, supplies, cash or documents.

(6) Inspection and liaison visits to the parties to the dispute.

m. Peacekeeping forces will not normally carry arms:

(1) When performing non-operational duties, staff officers and clerks.

(2) When civil police are attached to a peacekeeping force.

(3) When peacekeeping troops are outside the buffer zone, area of separation, or area of operations.

(4) When off duty.

n. Each peacekeeping force will set the amount of ammunition to be carried by each individual on vehicles and maintained on observation posts and positions, and to be held in reserve in accordance with the perceived threat.

## **CHAPTER V**

### **SUPPORTING FUNCTIONS**

#### **V-1. INFORMATION.**

a. Belligerent parties may perceive information-gathering as a hostile act. Intelligence operations may therefore destroy the trust which the parties should have in the peacekeeping forces. However, it is reasonable to assume that the parties will pursue their divergent aims by exploiting the presence of the peacekeeping forces. They may even attempt to deceive them from time to time. Host governments and parties to a dispute are sensitive about the collection of information concerning their military dispositions, because a peacekeeping force is in touch with both sides, each of which is the enemy of the other. Host government officials and the leadership of the opposing parties at all levels are likely to be more frank and forthcoming if they feel sure they can trust a peacekeeping force's discretion.

b. Circumstances may place the force under direct attack. Such attacks may come from one of the parties to the agreement, or from extremist elements acting independently. This poses a serious dilemma, but, whatever the circumstances, the peacekeeper needs information. If the peacekeeper cannot use the full range of his national intelligence resources, he must, as a minimum, have their products.

c. Every item of operational information becomes important. The members of a peacekeeping force have to be information-conscious at all times. The peacekeeper must remain constantly alert to what takes place around him and to any change or inconsistency in the behavior, attitude, and activities of the military and civilian populace.

d. Although the word "intelligence" is not used in peacekeeping organizations, the majority of the work of the staff is carried out with this in mind. All the principles of intelligence work and the intelligence cycle, direction, collection, processing and dissemination are adhered to as closely as possible in order to achieve a useful end product. The intelligence staff's tasks are directed mainly towards military assessments of the opposing sides' intentions and capabilities in relation to the mission of the peacekeeping force.

e. While the list is not exhaustive, the kind of information which is necessary to a peacekeeping force's efficient functioning includes:



- (1) Adjustments in deployment.
- (2) Changes in military strengths.
- (3) Preparation of new defensive positions.
- (4) The location and types of minefields.
- (5) Changes in Order of Battle and types of equipment.

(6) Movement of civil populations. A sudden mass exodus from an area may alert a peacekeeping force and help in preventing a serious breach of the peace.

(7) Changes in civilian behavior as an indicator of changes in attitude to other factions. A village whose inhabitants become unusually quiet or remain indoors may constitute a warning of trouble which can be averted by negotiations and precautionary measures.

(8) Changes in the attitude of one or more of the parties to a dispute towards the peacekeeping force itself. This may provide a cue to initiate negotiations and take precautions.

(9) One of the parties may suddenly impose a restriction, such as movement along a road or access to a particular area, in addition to restrictions announced in advance for some reason. In the former case, it is often the peacekeeper who is the first to discover it when he, stopped unexpectedly, encounters a road block.

(10) The appearance and names of new leaders and personalities should be noted.

(11) Inevitably, peacekeeping forces will pick up rumors. These must be treated with caution as the accusation of a party on unsubstantiated evidence will cause offense, mistrust, and trouble. If a peacekeeper can disprove a rumor, he may be able to allay unfounded fears and restore confidence.

f. The contending parties will condemn covert means of obtaining information as espionage which, if true, can jeopardize the neutrality of a peacekeeping force. One of the main differences between internal security and peacekeeping operations is that only certain methods are permissible in the latter. They include:

- (1) Observation.

- (2) Patrols, mounted and dismounted. Patrolling is carried out in a "high profile" manner using easily distinguishable markings, such as the UN flag and white-painted

vehicles displaying the force's insignia. Patrols must not only be constantly alert to watch for indicators, but they also represent the peacekeeping force's presence on the ground to encourage an atmosphere of security and confidence in their area of operations.

(3) Contacts and conversations with the parties to the dispute and local officials.

(4) Official reports from host government and other sources.

(5) The media, newspapers, radio, and television.

(6) Peacekeeping forces which have observer groups working under their operational control have additional means of obtaining overt information. Observers usually serve longer tours than peacekeeping troops, and they often provide the latter with a wealth of useful background information which may prevent them from misinterpreting situations and making avoidable errors. To ensure that there is a thorough exchange of information gleaned from observer groups and peacekeeping forces operating in the same area, the observer group usually attaches an observer to each battalion headquarters to coordinate all observation post and patrol reports.

g. Long-range surveillance carried out by maritime aircraft and naval craft are useful for alerting inshore and land peacekeeping forces. Identification may be a problem at sea, and a host government policy on stopping, questioning, and searching foreign ships within territorial waters may be needed. Peacekeeping forces may deploy inshore surveillance by helicopters, inshore vessels, land-based radar, and look-out stations to cover all likely approaches. Interception of unidentified craft or of vessels whose mission or cargo is suspect is possible at sea or on land. Host nation police, coastguardsmen, or their equivalent may embark in inshore craft or accompany detachments on land for this purpose. There are three types of naval surveillance:

(1) Long-range airborne surveillance.

(2) Offshore seaborne surveillance.

(3) Inshore seaborne surveillance and intercept.

h. Operation of overt intelligence collection systems should be clearly understood as part of the peacekeeping rules. Otherwise, impartiality and effectiveness of the peacekeepers may be seriously impaired. During a peacekeeping operation, distinguishing friend from foe may be a serious problem. Having accurate intelligence on, and a good communications network with, the major, active players is another primary consideration.

i. Communications are essential among all elements engaged in surveillance so that targets acquired far out at sea may pass successively to inshore craft, and coastal surveillance.

j. Peacekeeping operations should be under the command of one headquarters and include elements from naval forces, air forces, and those land forces with the tasks of surveillance and observation.

k. It may be necessary to coordinate not only the civil and military agencies but also several different civil agencies which may all have a part to play (although they may not always be accustomed to working together). Such host nation agencies as port and river authorities, customs, coastguardsmen, and civil police in coastal areas may all need representation in the coastal command system.

l. Reconnaissance elements are useful to gather information on the activities of the belligerent parties without causing them overt concern. They can support fact-finding exercises, inspections, and investigations. They can provide aerial photography and observation of areas of concern to the peacekeeping operation.

m. Parties to a peacekeeping agreement are always suspicious of espionage. Restrictions on flying may be written into the status of forces agreement covering:

- (1) Areas not to be overflown.
- (2) Photography.
- (3) Night flying.
- (4) The carrying of non-peacekeeping force personnel.

## V-2. PSYCHOLOGICAL OPERATIONS.

a. The successful conduct of any peacekeeping operation often depends on such particular factors as continued observance and cooperation by all parties to the cease-fire and security agreement, the impartiality and objectivity of the peacekeepers, and the support of world opinion. Effective utilization of these factors requires an integrated psychological strategy.

b. Psychological operations (PSYOP) can play an important role in facilitating cooperation between the parties to the dispute and their supporters, on the one hand, and the peacekeeping forces, on the other hand. Tactically, psychological operations can assist the peacekeeping forces in keeping the peace through persuasion rather than intimidation. Through such local information programs as radio and television

newscasts, PSYOP can help to ensure the peacekeeping objectives and efforts are fully understood and supported by the parties to the dispute and their civilian populations. In any war-torn area, one can expect a large influx of displaced personnel. Psychological operations can help to amplify any US humanitarian assistance and civic action program provided to these personnel in order to win the favor of the populace and the parties to the dispute. These assistance programs, however, always merit careful consideration for both negative as well as positive political impact, and must be given in total impartiality. In addition, PSYOP can help to promote acceptance of a cease-fire, withdrawal of troops, and compliance with security agreements by influencing attitudes, emotions, opinions, and behavior. Such efforts can help to counter rumors and disinformation and may even resolve some problems between the parties while they search for a long-term solution to their conflict.

c. Prior to any peacekeeping deployment, PSYOP personnel can provide training support to sensitize troops to the importance of total impartiality and objectivity in their mission, and to familiarize the troops with the dynamics of the political situation in the operating area, local culture, mores, religions, and taboos. Such training programs help the troops to increase their effectiveness and gain credibility and respect for the peacekeeping force.

d. More importantly in the operational and strategic sense, PSYOP can help project to regional actors and the world community a favorable image of an impartial and capable US peacekeeping force. In the world of perception where public opinion reigns, the successful conduct of a peacekeeping operation by the United States in a volatile situation will tremendously enhance its image as an impartial player and as a viable and credible participant in future events in that region. Therefore, the creation and projection of such image should be an integral operational and strategic objective.

### V-3. PUBLIC AFFAIRS.

a. This section discusses public affairs primarily from the viewpoint of the United Nations, its peacekeeping forces, observer missions and those who devise peacekeeping initiatives. However, the same principles considered here apply to non-UN forces' interests in the field of public information.

b. Peacekeeping operations are carried out, especially in the initial phases, under the full glare of public scrutiny. Using satellites and modern communications technology, the press are able to distribute reports and pictures faster than the news can be released by the peacekeeping force or observer mission. Incidents, sometimes embroidered or slanted towards a partisan viewpoint, appear on television the same day and in the press the

next morning to excite audiences in the countries which are parties to a dispute and their allies.

c. The role of the press during delicate negotiations is indeed of incalculable importance. When information is withheld, journalists understandably enough fall back on speculation. Such speculation, although usually inaccurate, is often near enough to the truth to be accepted as such by large sections of public opinion, and even by governments. The Secretary-General, on the one hand, must maintain absolute discretion about his confidential relationship with governments. The parties to a conflict, on the other hand, may sometimes find it advantageous to leak part of the story to the press in order to build up public support for their own position, and on occasion such activities grow into a fully orchestrated press campaign. In such circumstances it is extremely difficult, if not impossible, for the Secretary-General to set the record straight without destroying his position of confidence with governments with which he is dealing, and he must usually suffer in silence the criticisms aroused by false accounts of his activities.

d. The aim of the United Nations is to foster and to facilitate good public relations and an effective press information service, so as to ensure that accurate and objective reporting of the operation of its peacekeeping forces and missions is available for world public consumption.

e. United Nations policy is to provide every possible facility to the media to observe and report on its role and any activity or incidents of interest. Peacekeeping unit commanders should only deny press facilities with the prior agreement, or decision, of force headquarters when their presence might aggravate the situation. However, some control of the way in which information is handled is necessary if the Secretary-General is not to find out about an incident through the media before he has been appraised of the facts by the force concerned. It is important that the information which reaches UN Headquarters in New York, or the authority controlling any non-UN peacekeeping force, is not only accurate but timely.

#### V-4. LOGISTICS.

a. The United Nations has no logistic base to support a force arriving in a new operational area. The funds for each operation are only approved after the establishment of a new force and then so only to cover the cost of running the force for the agreed mandate period. The procurement of supplies and equipment can only start when the funds have been approved by the General Assembly. Consequently, a peacekeeping force must be capable of supporting themselves for the first 90 days of the operation.

b. The main logistic problems of a peacekeeping force are:

(1) National variations in organization, ration scales and types of equipment, reflected in differing logistic systems, cause problems of compatibility and interoperability.

(2) The movement of a unit with its heavy equipment and supplies presents complications:

(a) The move to the area itself, involving the availability of aircraft, staging facilities and overflight clearances, and the provision of shipping by sealift.

(b) Deployment and resupply in a large underdeveloped country with few airfields and transportation facilities.

c. Political disturbances may have disrupted the host nation's economic infrastructure.

d. While the operational need is for the speedy arrival of peacekeeping forces, unless the movement of logistic units has sufficient priority the administrative consequences may hinder the operation.

e. Inevitably, the need to purchase and procure essentials in the early stages of an operation takes priority over a strict regard for financial economy. A strict system of accountability is necessary, together with the issue of instructions to cover such major procedures as:

(1) Methods of requesting supplies.

(2) Requesting repairs and how and where they are to be carried out, i.e., by local contractor.

(3) Disposal of equipment.

f. There is no standing contingency planning organization within the United Nations, although it tries to anticipate events and react to a crisis as quickly as political and financial restrictions allow.

g. An advance party should make a reconnaissance of the area to assess the availability of billets and logistic resources and send a list of essential items and facilities which cannot be obtained back to the unit. A checklist is at Appendix C.

h. Types of logistic units that may be necessary include engineers, communication, transportation, medical, maintenance, and supply.

i. Equipment that will be necessary includes surveillance equipment, riot control equipment, ammunition, spare parts, dining facility equipment, peculiar climate clothing and equipment, medical supplies, and NBC equipment.

j. The United Nations, after examining the composition of a new force, will decide which member states will provide the logistic units. The Field Operations Division, in conjunction with the Military Advisor to the Secretary-General, examine the composition of a new force, including proposals as to which member states might provide the logistic units. Their choice is subject to the approval of the host nations and of the Security Council, which must endorse the mandate. The Office of Field Operational and External Support Activities (OFOESA) is responsible for the logistic support of an operation and exercises control through the Chief Administrative Officer (CAO), a UN civilian official, in the field. The CAO works in parallel with the force chief of staff, who controls the military chief of logistics. There are three ways of providing a force with logistic support: one nation, shared responsibility by one or more nations, decentralization.

(1) The most efficient method is for one nation to coordinate the entire logistic effort. However, it is not always acceptable politically for a force to be dependent on one nation.

(2) This method introduces the principle of interdependence. No one member state has control of the logistic system.

(3) In a large undeveloped area of operations lacking in good communications, the peacekeeping force may be split up on separate tasks over considerable distances. To support a series of widely separated operations, a measure of decentralization in the logistic support system may be necessary. It may also be necessary to appoint a chief administrative officer for each area working under the overall policy direction of the force chief administrative officer. These subordinate CAO's will coordinate procurement in their own areas using local resources to obtain supplies, resources, and services under contract.

k. Appendix B explains the methods used by the United States to support UN peacekeeping forces.

l. The responsibility for providing airlift to, from, and within the operational area is divided as follows:

(1) The Under Secretary-General's Office negotiates the airlift to be provided by member governments to move their own contingents, and the contingents of other states which lack the resources.

(2) The OFOESA hires aircraft from commercial carriers for the same purpose or for use in the operational area.

m. The Under Secretary-General's Office negotiates for base facilities in the operational area.

n. When essential items are not available through the UN supply system, the only practicable source is to request the item from another government. The OFOESA will provide a Letter of Assist to the USUN requesting the item. The USUN will then process the request through normal US supply channels.

o. The funding and logistic support for a non-UN force are usually far simpler than for a UN peacekeeping force. Fewer nations are involved and it is therefore easier to reach agreement. Sharing the costs and the division of logistic responsibilities will be a matter for intergovernmental negotiation with the lead nation acting as coordinator.

#### V-5. SEALIFT/AIRLIFT.

a. Initial movement into the mission area will be by air or sea as required. Equipment and supplies transported by ship should arrive in the area of operation simultaneously with the main body. The decision to use sealift should be made as early as possible.

b. United States airlift assets may be used to move personnel, equipment, and supplies in support of UN peacekeeping operations or to support US efforts alone. The trend and development of transport systems makes it possible to move a great number of personnel and equipment in one flight. Runways, technical equipment and other airport facilities can, however, limit the landing of large cargo aircraft in the mission area. It may be necessary to transship to lighter aircraft in order to reach the area of conflict. United States Air Force logistic assets may be tasked to support US or non-US peacekeeping operations.

#### V-6. COMMUNICATIONS.

a. Communications between the force headquarters and UN Headquarters in New York are the responsibility of the CAO. United Nations Headquarters provides secure telex facilities. In the initial stages of a peacekeeping operation it may be necessary to use the diplomatic links between the host government and New York until the UN link can be established.

b. Non-UN forces will normally establish their own links.



c. The guiding principle for both UN and non-UN forces is that the force command and administrative nets should be provided by one national contingent because of the advantages to be gained from:

(1) Having the control station and rear links manned by operators whose native language is the same.

(2) Standardizing voice and telex procedures.

(3) Standardizing equipment and consequently simplifying repair and maintenance.

d. The peacekeeping force headquarters is responsible for providing secure teleprinter and very-high frequency communications between force headquarters and UN Headquarters in New York. The United Nations does have a satellite communications system.

e. The force command, logistic, and liaison nets are provided by the unit. If the force is particularly large and spread out, it may be necessary to introduce another headquarters to facilitate control. Each force has an official working language which must be acceptable to the host country.

f. The force communications officer should liaise with the host nation government(s) and armed forces on:

(1) The use of civil communications facilities.

(2) Frequency allocation to avoid interference with:

(a) Civil communications.

(b) Military communications.

(c) Air traffic control communications.

g. To avoid interference with the host nation's communications, and to avoid suspicion that the force's communications are being used clandestinely, contingents should only use frequencies allocated by the force communications officer.

h. An observer group will provide the following communications:

(1) Observer group headquarters to observation posts and patrols. Because the former are often widely separated in difficult terrain, they require high antenna masts, which are sometimes used as artillery ranging indicators by both sides.

(2) Liaison with peacekeeping forces. Where there are several observer missions and peacekeeping forces in one area, platoon headquarters will establish communication between the mission headquarters and the various force headquarters. Observer groups will also maintain liaison officers using observer group radios at the headquarters of associated peacekeeping forces.

(3) Internal missions maintain their own communications, separate from peacekeeping forces, with host governments.

i. In some forces it is customary to lay line between battalion and company headquarters and the command posts of their opposite members in the parties to the dispute to provide quick telephone connection in an emergency and to arrange meetings at contact points.

j. Each national contingent is responsible for providing its own internal communications, including repair facilities, provided a contingent's equipment is compatible with that of the nation providing the force communications. However, contingent communication officers must find out whether such facilities exist before arrival in the operational area. National contingents use their own language and radio procedures on unit nets.

k. Because distances in peacekeeping operations are usually much greater than in war, it is sometimes necessary to equip a battalion with special radios, using what are normally battalion radios on company nets and longer range sets on the battalion net.

l. There are normally four channels for use by national contingents to communicate with their own governments:

(1) The UN force headquarters link to UN Headquarters in New York, or with subsidiary UN communication and radio relay centers, then via international communications.

(2) Civil channels if funds permit.

(3) Diplomatic communications from their own embassy.

(4) Secure military communications direct to national headquarters.

m. Because frequencies must be cleared with the host government, there is a security risk. Direct references to the identity of call signs and codes can compromise security. The following information must always be encoded: information relating to the opposing force's locations, size or strengths, identity of units, major equipment deployment, command

personalities, and any matters relating to the deployment of the force reserve to meet confrontations between the opposing forces.

n. Codes and procedures used for handling classified information on command or contingent nets should be standardized. This is the responsibility of the force communication officer. Within both peacekeeping forces and observer groups all call signs are usually fixed.

o. In non-UN peacekeeping operations a nation will be selected to provide the force communications in a similar way to a UN force. Communications between the force and its political authority may be provided by the same or a different nation. The same considerations apply to communications between national contingents and their own governments as for UN forces.

p. The C<sup>3</sup> support will not be appreciably different from the normal communication support provided to any operation. Particular attention must be given to ensure required connectivity is provided to the headquarters tasked with overall supervision of the operation. In addition, the Air Force may be tasked to provide tactical communications to various elements of the peacekeeping force. Procedures may differ based on support to a non-US contingent.

## CHAPTER VI

### TRAINING

#### VI-1. PERSONNEL SELECTION.

a. Selection of personnel for peacekeeping should consider the stresses and strains of this unique task. It is not without hazards nor pressures which can erode the necessary vigilance and alertness. The selection process should use as a foundation units and individuals capable of coping with a conflict environment that will produce a very different reaction than normally derived from military training. These include the capacity of infinite patience and restraint. They must be able to combine an approachable, understanding, and tactful manner with fairness and firmness. A professional demeanor which stresses quiet diplomacy and reasoning will achieve more than arrogance, anger, disdain, coercion, or sarcasm. Personnel must be able to cope with unpopularity, for each side will seek to press their position and then react vocally when stopped. To be unpopular with both sides at the same time is probably the best pointer to impartiality.

b. Leadership selection should focus on individuals who are credible and decisive, display high objectivity and a deep sense of impartiality. They should have the capacity to accommodate frustrations and humiliations but must at the same time inspire confidence and sustain high morale among their people. They must be able to be mentally alert and up-to-date with all occurrences in their area of operation. They must be able to learn quickly the politics at play in the mission area, the habits, characteristics and customs of the indigenous people.

c. A peacekeeping force will require both permanently and temporarily assigned units. The permanently assigned units usually make up the commander's staff and a logistic support element. The temporarily assigned units, which are the bulk of the force, usually consist of some type of infantry task force. Since the establishment of peacekeeping-only units is very unlikely, the selection of units to participate in peacekeeping operations should be based on the organization, composition, capabilities, and wartime commitments of existing units. The logistic support element will likely be a combination of civilian contractor and military personnel. The normal tour should be at least one year for the permanently assigned units and 180 days for the temporarily assigned units. To maintain unit cohesion, the temporarily assigned units should be rotated, whenever possible, as a unit and not as individual fills.

VI-2. PREPARATION. Peacekeeping calls for an adjustment of attitude and approach by the individual to a set of circumstances different from those he would normally find on the field of battle--an adjustment to suit the needs of a peaceable intervention rather than of an enforcement action. Above all don't over prepare the force, 2 weeks of training should be adequate to properly prepare the force.

VI-3. PREDEPLOYMENT TRAINING.

a. To accomplish peacekeeping, individuals and units need training in the various skills and techniques prior to their deployment. The urgent need to deploy peacekeeping forces to establish a cease-fire often precludes adequate preparations, and training may not always be possible. However, with prior planning, a training program can be developed that will assist commanders to prepare for these missions. A 2 week refresher course should be conducted for personnel that have participated in earlier peacekeeping operations so their skills can be improved.

b. Good leadership is very important at every level from the unit commander to the most junior leader. The situation will require skill, imagination, flexibility, adaptability, and patience. Training emphasis is placed on individual military skills. The following are skills and techniques for individuals and units to be included in the development of a unit training program.

VI-4. TACTICAL SKILLS. Training to enhance the tactical skill of a peacekeeping unit is necessary. Basic military skills must be stressed in a field environment, including small-unit collective training. Discipline is a prime concern because of the stress caused by the environment, the dullness of the routine, and the possibility of an incident occurring. A training program should include as a minimum the following military skills:

- a. Operating checkpoints and observation posts.
- b. Patrolling.
- c. Map reading.
- d. Weapons and equipment identification.
- e. Culture, language, habits, religion, and characteristics of the local indigenous personnel.
- f. Environment survival classes.
- g. Knowledge of first aid.

- h. Civil disturbance training.
- i. Rules of engagement.
- j. Search and seizure techniques.
- k. Legal considerations.
- l. Airmobile operations.
- m. Explosive ordnance recognition (primarily landmines).
- n. Field sanitation and hygiene.
- o. Communications.
- p. Civil-military operations.
- q. NBC training.

#### VI-5. PRE-MISSION TRAINING.

a. In preparing for a peacekeeping mission, the force requires specific, mission-oriented training prior to deployment. At the core of all training is the orientation of a unit to conduct operations in a multinational or as a unilateral peacekeeping force. The unit must clearly understand its place in the force, its objectives, and the implications of its presence as part of the force.

b. The entire unit leadership must understand the unit's mission and provide clear guidance on what is to be accomplished. The unit should conduct training during the predeployment and in-country phases to ensure that every member understands the reasons for his/her presence. Unit leadership must develop and maintain the highest degree of unit discipline throughout the course of the mission.

c. Training of individuals for peacekeeping duties should try to provide patience, flexibility, discipline, professionalism, impartiality, tact, inquisitiveness.

(1) Patience. Except in serious crises, which are fairly infrequent, nothing happens quickly and an over-eagerness to force the pace in negotiations may prejudice their success. This is not only true at the higher levels but at the lower levels, where local difficulties are often resolved by company officers and senior noncommissioned officers (NCO's).

(2) Flexibility. It is necessary to look at all the facets of a problem and to use one's ingenuity to explore every feasible course of action or solution which does not violate the mandate.

(3) Discipline. Smartness, alertness, a military bearing, good behavior on and off duty and courtesy all help to promote the prestige of a force. If the force is held in high esteem by the parties to the dispute, they are likely to pay more attention to its advice and respect its authority in a crisis. Good discipline helps to make a force's task easier.

(4) Professionalism. A strong sense of professionalism promotes efficiency in every activity. If a force's observations and actions have a reputation for accuracy and competence, the parties are more likely to accept its protests about violations and avoid confrontations.

(5) Impartiality. In all its transactions and contacts a force must guard its reputation for even-handedness. Officers and enlisted personnel must be careful off duty, both in their actions, as well as criticism of either side. Controversial, off-the-record remarks have a habit of reaching an unintended audience to make the force's task more difficult. They may lead to a demand for the offender's removal and, if reflecting a prejudice believed to be widely held in a national contingent, to pressure for its withdrawal.

(6) Tact. The official parties to a dispute are likely to be sensitive and apt to take offense to any imagined slight. Paramilitary forces are even more touchy and unpredictable in their reactions, because they are not officially recognized. Tact is necessary in all dealings with the parties but this need not detract from an essential honesty of purpose and firmness when appropriate.

(7) Inquisitiveness. The individual needs to question with caution everything that occurs within his area of responsibility. The normal routine of daily life should not become so familiar that one does not notice a small event that could be of importance if it is matched with information from other observers.

VI-6. INTELLIGENCE. An important aspect of training for a peacekeeping mission is to understand the force is the target of foreign intelligence activities. A good counterintelligence program is desired, one that includes emphasis on communications security.

#### VI-7. OBSERVING AND REPORTING.

a. The observation and reporting functions of the peacekeeping force are extremely important because these are the force's primary functions. Violations of the treaty may not be obvious and the importance of accurately reporting everything observed requires emphasis. When accumulated at force headquarters, all routine reports may form a pattern of activity

within the zone or sector. The variation of this activity may provide clues as to changes that may eventually constitute treaty violations. Individuals should know the standard reporting formats, to include situation reports, shooting reports, overflight reports, and aircraft sighting reports. Personnel should learn to recognize armored vehicles and equipment. The training includes all available graphic training aids, including 35mm slides, scale models, and flash cards.

b. Training in the operating of an observation post is essential. An observation post is a small unit-sized installation. Small units must learn the typical layout of an observation post and checkpoint and the general daily routine of duty on an observation post. A unit may be required to live and work on the observation post for many days at a time, isolated from the larger parent organization. The force may be of mixed nationalities which adds to the complexity of the situation.

(1) Security procedures at an observation post include a stand-to at Beginning Morning Nautical Twilight (just before sunrise) and Ending Evening Nautical Twilight (just after sunset). Perimeter sweep patrols should be dispatched immediately after stand-to.

(2) Individuals manning checkpoints astride major roads have to be taught to slow and observe traffic without stopping it, allowing them to observe and report traffic passing from one zone to another.

(3) Vehicles and personnel leaving and entering installations should be stopped and searched for contraband and explosives. Personnel must learn not only how to search, but also how to search courteously without undue force.

VI-8. COMMUNICATIONS. Communications are an essential part of knowing what is going on and being in a position to influence events. It is difficult to solve the problem of providing adequate communications for the force before it is deployed because so much depends on the circumstances of the operation. In one theater the difficulty may lie in the great distances involved. In another, or possibly in a different part of the same one, the difficulty is screening in urban areas. Sometimes military communications may be inadequate, but usually procedures will need attention because they are designed to cater for a totally different sort of mission.

VI-9. PATROLLING. Small units must be knowledgeable in patrolling techniques. Training in the proper conduct of reconnaissance patrols requires review and reinforcement. Organization of patrols, selection of patrol routes, and the patrol debriefing format must be taught. Stealth and concealment are not so important. The mission stresses presence,



reliability, and visibility of the peacekeeping force. Land navigation principles and road marches can be integrated into this training.

VI-10. LANGUAGE TRAINING. All leaders should undergo basic language instruction for the languages of both the host country and the countries assigned to the peacekeeping force. Such training exposes them to some of the more common words and phrases. Training is also required for all personnel on the customs of the local population.

VI-11. EXPLOSIVE ORDNANCE TRAINING. Training from the local Explosive Ordnance Disposal Detachment prior to deployment can familiarize personnel with different types of land mines. This includes not only Warsaw Pact mines but also French, British, German, and US mines. The thrust of the training is to enable the individual to recognize, mark, and report mines and to understand that land mines, no matter how old they appear, are not inert. Another consideration is how to extricate one's self from a minefield.

VI-12. NBC TRAINING. Training in the methods of identifying and handling the effects of the use of NBC weapons is important in the training for any peacekeeping operation. The peacekeeper must be able to recognize the different types of chemical agents that may be used and be able to take the appropriate action to ensure not only his own safety, but the safety of civilians and the parties to the dispute.

VI-13. PHASES OF TRAINING. Training can be divided into three phases:

a. Phase 1 - Initial training of individuals and small units. This training should include:

- (1) Range Firing.
- (2) Night firing and training with night vision equipment.
- (3) Establishing checkpoints - vehicle search and checkpoint security.
- (4) Anti-hostage drills.
- (5) Use of force - principles.
- (6) Mandate - the unit mission.
- (7) First aid.
- (8) Physical training.

- (9) Communications.
- (10) NBC training.
- b. Phase 2 - Continue individual and begin unit training.
  - (1) Checkpoint procedures/security.
  - (2) Reporting.
  - (3) Map reading.
  - (4) Night vision equipment.
  - (5) Establishing temporary Landing Zone by night.
  - (6) Grenade training.
  - (7) Training for operations in built up areas.
  - (8) Field sanitation.
  - (9) Driver training.
  - (10) Observation post duties.
  - (11) Basic field fortifications
  - (12) Medical processing.
- c. Phase 3 - Complete unit training.
  - (1) Completion of processing for overseas movement.
  - (2) Unit exercises.

#### VI-14. PEACEKEEPING MISSION SUSTAINMENT TRAINING.

a. When a peacekeeping force is deployed in an emergency to interpose between combatants following the conclusion of an armistice, there will be little warning. The units designated will have little time for training.

b. Once a force is established, it will be possible to rotate the units making up the force on a regular basis. Units earmarked in advance will be given time to learn the techniques peculiar to peacekeeping. Appendix D is a peacekeeping exercise to help train force members in peacekeeping techniques.

c. Once in the area of operations, time may not permit anything other than orientations and reinforcement training from the unit being relieved. Training must be organized, planned,

and conducted prior to deployment based on the time and resources available. Training in the area of responsibility may be restricted by whatever agreement exists between the parties involved in the dispute.

d. The commander must continually emphasize the neutrality of the force. Casual contact with the forces and personnel of both sides in the dispute, which could result in one side's accusing the force of favoritism, has to be avoided. Once the force has lost its position of neutrality, its usefulness is seriously degraded. However, contact between different contingents of the force pays dividends in terms of cohesion and interoperability. This contact aids in welding the contingents together into a more cohesive unit, and is achievable through small unit exchanges, inter-contingent competitions, conferences, and social events.

e. Leaders at junior officer and NCO level must have the motivation to act as leaders and be supervised in their leadership. Only in extreme circumstances will leaders be bypassed by senior leaders in the exercise of responsibility or of command. The highest standards of leadership must apply not only during operations but also during training. To assist in the development of the leadership potential of the section and sub-section commanders, their responsibilities should be emphasized from the commencement of training and their sections should train as a team throughout.

VI-15. MORALE, DISCIPLINE, AND ADMINISTRATION. The small unit leader is responsible for the peacekeeping mission 24 hours a day, along with the health, morale, and training of his unit. The leader is normally accustomed to seeing only part of his unit a maximum of 12 hours per day in garrison. During peacekeeping operations, he will have all of it, in addition to other personnel, 24 hours a day, 7 days a week, under conditions of potential monotony. The success of the mission, then, is predicated on the leadership and initiative of this small unit leader to conduct operations and maintain the morale of his unit.

a. Although environmental and survival training is hard to conduct when one is not in the actual environment, this training must take place. It should at least introduce subjects which further training can reinforce after the force has deployed into its operational area.

b. Transportation of personnel and supplies is a challenge for a unit occupying a large sector. Air transportation via helicopter is important, including techniques in airmobility (load planning, pathfinder techniques, and sling loading). Units often deploy by air into and out of observation posts and have to know how to stow their equipment aboard the helicopter. Training in initial ground control procedures for incoming helicopters is

also important. Implicit in the need for transportation is the need for emphasis in vehicle and aircraft maintenance. If transportation breaks down because of inadequate maintenance, mission accomplishment will be jeopardized.

c. Personal hygiene, medical self-aid, and sanitation are of extreme importance. Observation posts and checkpoints can be far removed from medical facilities, and widespread illness could cause the force to fail in its mission. Human waste must be disposed of each day, and individuals have to keep themselves scrupulously clean to avoid disease, particularly gastrointestinal disease.

d. A standard operating procedure (SOP) for the peacekeeping operation is necessary. This SOP must, as a minimum, include reporting formats and procedures, rules of engagement, observation and checkpoint routines, and resupply procedures. The SOP may also include vehicular and personnel search procedures, medical considerations and evacuation requests, lists of persons allowed to enter peacekeeping installations, and contact restrictions with local forces and the populace. This SOP should be based on any area handbooks produced by the parent command.

e. A peacekeeping mission is meant to be visible to all concerned. Because of this fact, the force is scrutinized by the locals, and the other contingents. The force must therefore reflect vigilance, readiness, and competence in its duties. Individuals in isolated observation posts and checkpoints may become bored with the daily routine, and it takes innovative leadership to take steps to keep interest up. Rotation of units between observation posts and checkpoints, as well as out of sector, can help avert boredom.

f. The nature of the mission demands a high standard of discipline and, in particular, self-discipline. Discipline is a state of mind which is essential to the efficient performance of duty. Commanders at all levels must be conscious of the importance of good discipline during training. Special attention must be paid to the following:

- (1) Proper briefing so that all individuals know what is going on.

- (2) Issue of clear concise and simple orders.

- (3) A high standard of cleanliness, care and maintenance of all weapons, equipment and uniforms.

- (4) Motivation of all personnel to maintain a high standard of discipline.

- (5) Regular inspection and supervision by leaders.

**VI-16. MISSION SUSTAINMENT TRAINING.**

a. The unit commander must also plan to conduct training for the unit that will allow it to maintain its ability to conduct its primary mission when it is not involved in a peacekeeping mission.

b. This requires the unit to incorporate basic military skill training, and small unit tactical training into the routine of normal day-to-day activities. Because of political concerns, this training requires flexibility and imagination in order to complete this important task without causing concern among the parties to the dispute.

**VI-17. POST-PEACEKEEPING MISSION TRAINING.**

a. Peacekeeping requires a complete change in orientation for military personnel. Prior to the peacekeeping mission, training was provided to prepare the combat ready individual to one that is constrained in all his actions. At the conclusion of the mission, actions are necessary to return the unit to combat ready status.

b. Unit commander's must plan to spend time after return from a peacekeeping mission doing refresher training and redeveloping skills and abilities that have been affected by the nature of any peacekeeping operation. This will require a training program to hone those skills necessary to obtain the standards of a combat ready unit.

## **APPENDIX A**

### **LOGISTIC SUPPORT OF UNITED NATIONS PEACEKEEPING FORCES**

A-1. **PURPOSE.** This appendix describes procedures for providing logistic support to the United Nations Peacekeeping Forces.

A-2. **AUTHORITY.** The United Nations Participation Act of 1945, PL 72-264, as amended, authorizes the President to provide reimbursable logistic support to the UN Peacekeeping forces.

A-3. **COMMAND AND STAFF FUNCTIONS.**

a. Within the Department of Defense, the Office of the Deputy Chief of Staff for Logistics (ODCSLOG), Headquarters, Department of the Army (HQDA), serves at the direction of the JCS as the executive agency for this support.

b. The Chief, Troop Support Logistics Office (DALO-SMS), Directorate for Supply and Maintenance, ODCSLOG, HQDA, develops policies and procedures pertaining to logistic support to UN peacekeeping.

c. The Commanding General, US Army Materiel Command (CG, AMC) has the operational responsibility concerning logistic support to UN peacekeeping.

d. The Commander, US Army General Material and Petroleum Activity (USAGMPA), Supply Support and Inventory Branch, has been delegated operational responsibility for logistic support to the United Nations by the CG, AMC.

e. The Commander, Military Traffic Management Command makes arrangements for the following:

(1) Transportation of material from the supplying activity to the port of exit within the continental United States (CONUS).

(2) Sealift and port handling services within CONUS and overseas.

f. Commander, Headquarters Southern European Task Force (SETAF) and 5th Support Command (SUPCOM) provides the UN Depot, Pisa, Italy with technical assistance concerning requirements validation and receiving operations.

#### A-4. REQUISITIONING PROCEDURES.

a. The UN Peacekeeping Force send requests for supplies to UN Headquarters in New York. When the United Nations determines that a requested item is available only through the DOD supply system (including in exceptional cases, items managed by the General Services Administration), it will send a request for the item to the US Mission to the United Nations (USUN) by means of an Assist Letter. These letters are numbered consecutively within a calendar year (that is 86-1, 86-2). They will also reflect the appropriate peacekeeping force project code. The current peacekeeping forces and the assigned DOD Military Standard Requisitioning and Issue Procedures (MILSTRIP) category C project codes are as follows:

(1) The United Nations Interim Force in Lebanon (UNIFIL), Project Code 3LN.

(2) The United Nations Disengagement Observer Force (UNDOF), Project Code 3LP.

(3) The United Nations Truce Supervision Organization in Palestine (UNTSO) Project Code 3LQ.

(4) United Nations Peacekeeping Forces Support, Project Code 3LU.

b. A request may consist of many different line items. For each line item requested, the Assist Letter will identify the source of supply, national stock number, unit of issue, nomenclature, quantity required, and date the material is required. The USUN will assign a MILSTRIP document number to each line item on the request. The DOD Activity Address Code WN7GX8 has been assigned to the USUN.

c. The USUN will ensure that all requests for DOD items are approved by the Department of State representative prior to dispatch. Approval is usually granted by way of a State Department release of an Airgram Message. The USUN will edit each request to determine if Headquarters, Department of the Army (HQDA) approval is required prior to processing of the requisition.

(1) Requests for major items (class VII) require HQDA approval. The USUN will forward a letter to HQDA (DALO-SMS), WASH DC 20310-0547, requesting approval to issue the item. Notification of approval or disapproval will be returned by endorsement to the USUN. Information copies will be sent to Commander, US Army General Materiel and Petroleum Activity, ATTN: STRGP-IS, New Cumberland, PA 17070-5008 and Commander, 8th Support Group, Camp Darby, APO New York 09109.

(2) Requests for secondary items and repair parts require no formal approval by HQDA or AMC.

d. Assist Letters for secondary items, repair parts, and approved major items will be forwarded directly to Commander, US Army General Materiel and Petroleum Activity, ATTN: STRGP-IS, New Cumberland, PA 17070-5008, for processing.

e. The USAGMPA (STRGP-IS) will prepare a MILSTRIP requisition DD 1348m (DOD Single Line Item Requisition System Document (Mechanical)) for each line item in the Assist Letter. The requisitions will be routed through the Defense Automatic Addressing System. The following standard information will be entered on each requisition:

(1) Requisition document number. This is the number assigned to each line item in the Assist Letter by the United Nations.

(2) Supplementary address-WK9GG2.

(3) Signal Code-J.

(4) Fund Code-XP.

(5) Distribution Code-A.

(6) Project Code-3LN, 3LP, 3LQ, or 3LU as appropriate.

(7) Other codes will be assigned in accordance with MILSTRIP procedures as outlined in AR 725-50.

#### A-5. SHIPPING PROCEDURES.

a. The supplying activity will ship the requested materiel to Commander, US Army General Materiel and Petroleum Activity, ATTN: STRGP-IS, Building 54-5, New Cumberland Army Depot (NCAD), New Cumberland, PA 17070-5008, for consolidation and/or palletization of materiel.

b. The NCAD will ship consolidated materiel to the 8th Support Group, Camp Darby, Italy, and mark the shipment for the appropriate UN peacekeeping force.

c. The NCAD will provide advance transportation control and movement document (TCMD) data to the appropriate clearance authority as prescribed in DOD 4500.32-R.



**A-6. BILLING PROCEDURES.**

a. Billing procedures will be handled by HQ USAMC, ATTN: AMCRM-FOR, 5001 Eisenhower Avenue, Alexandria, VA 22333-0001. Charges for materiel should be made in accordance with DOD Instruction 7230.7 and AR 37-60 (using the standard service price). Upon receipt of bills from a supply activity, HQ USAMC will:

(1) Compute the applicable accessorial, administrative, and transportation surcharges in accordance with AR 37-60. These charges will be entered, together with the accounting classification to be credited, on a separate billing document SF 1080 (Voucher for Transfers Between Appropriations and/or Funds).

(2) Send the billing document to the USUN, Military Staff Committee, 799 UN Plaza, New York, NY 10017, with a letter of transmittal that will be sequentially numbered by fiscal year. The letter will identify the total amount billed and direct that payment, by check, be made payable to FAO, DA Financial Operations, USAFAC, and forwarded to Commander, US Army Finance and Accounting Center, DA Financial Operations, ATTN: FINCO-AA, Indianapolis, IN 46249-1366.

(3) Provide a copy of the transmittal letter with copy of SF 1080 to HQDA (DALO-SMS), WASH DC 20310-0547, and USAFAC, ATTN: FINCO-AA, Indianapolis, IN 46249-1366.

b. Upon receipt of reimbursement from the USUN, USAFAC will make payment of the supply activity's bill and process collections applicable to accessorial, administrative, and transportation surcharges for the appropriate fiscal offices.

**A-7. DISCREPANCY REPORTING AND PROCESSING.**

a. The USUN will report discrepancies in shipments to USAGMPA, ATTN: STRGP-IS.

(1) SF 364 (Report of Discrepancy) will be used to report supply related discrepancies (shipping type, item, or packaging discrepancies in accordance with DLAR 4140.55/AR 735-11-2/NAVMATINST 4355.73B/AFR 400-54/MCO 4430.3H.

(2) Transportation related discrepancies will be reported in accordance with AR 55-38/NAVSUPINST 4610.33C/AFR 75-18/MCO P4610.19D/DLAR 4500.15, using SF 361 (Discrepancy in Shipment Report 9DISREP).

b. After review, USAGMPA will forward the reports to the appropriate activity for processing in accordance with applicable joint service regulations on discrepancy reporting.

c. Billing adjustment will be granted by the supply activity concerned, when appropriate, pursuant to DOD 4000.25-7-M.

**A-8. MATERIEL RETURNS.**

a. Serviceable materiel not required by the UN peacekeeping force may be returned for credit, if applicable, in accordance with procedures in AR 725-50, Chapter 7. Requests for disposition instructions for the excess materiel should be forwarded from the USUN to USAGMPA, ATTN: STRGP-IS. The supply activity disposition instructions will be returned to the USUN by USAGMPA.

b. Excess GSA items are to be reported in accordance with prescribed procedures in AR 725-50, chapter 7, section IV.

c. Excess DLA items will be reported in accordance with AR 725-50, chapter 7, section V.

**A-9. LETTER OF INQUIRY.**

a. On occasion, the United Nations may need to request information, through the USUN, regarding outstanding Assist Letters. In such cases, the USUN will identify the Assist Letter number, requisition document numbers, the outstanding line items, and quantities and forward the request to the USAGMPA, ATTN: STRGP-IS, New Cumberland, PA 17070.

b. The USAGMPA will respond to the inquires within 2 weeks.

**A-10. REPORTS.**

a. Activity report (RCS CSGLD-1942). The USAGMPA will report quarterly on the volume of requisitions in support of UN peacekeeping. The report is due to HQDA (DALO-SMS) by the 10th working day following the end of each quarter and will include the following information:

(1) Number of open actions at the start of the quarter.

(2) Number of requisitions received during the quarter.  
(Indicate requisition number of each requisition received.)

(3) Number of requisitions completed during the quarter.  
(Indicate requisition number and date completed.)

(4) Number of open actions at the end of the quarter.

(5) Number of excess reports received during the quarter.

(6) Number of excess reports completed during the quarter.

(7) Number of discrepancy reports processed during the quarter. (Indicate report number.)

(8) Number of discrepancy reports completed during the quarter. (Indicate the report number and date completed.)

b. Annual financial report. By the 15th working day of January, USAMC (AMCRM-FOR) will forward an annual financial report of UN Peacekeeping Forces Logistical Support (one copy each in letter form) to HQDA (DALO-SMS), WASH DC 20310-0547, and one copy to HQ Defense Logistics Agency, ATTN: DLA-CFS, Cameron Station, Alexandria, VA 22304-6100. (Exempt report, AR 335-15, paragraph 5-2b(1).) Negative reports are not required. The report will be as of 31 December and will contain the following information:

(1) Total dollar value of bills submitted for reimbursement during the year.

(2) Total dollars reimbursed by the United Nations against current year and previous year billings by year.

(3) Dollar value and bill number of outstanding billings for the current and the previous years, by year.

c. Supplies receipt list. By the 15th working day following the end of each quarter, HQ 8th Support Group, Camp Darby, Italy, will forward the UN Peacekeeping Forces Supplies Receipt List (RCS CSGLD-1843) in card format to USAGMPA, ATTN: STRGP-IS, New Cumberland PA 17070-5008. An information copy should be forwarded, in letter format, to the USUN, ATTN: Military Staff Committee, 799 UN Plaza, New York, NY 10017. Transceiver cards to RIC A35 Routing RUCIFRW for receipt at the US Army Troop Support Command for input into the USAGMPA automated UN Processing Program. The report will cover the preceding quarter and will list all supplies received by the 8th Support Group in MILSTRIP receipt card (DS6) format.

## APPENDIX B

### PEACEKEEPING CHECKLIST

B-1. PURPOSE. This outlines personnel and administration procedures required in preparation for deployment of US forces as part of a peacekeeping operation.

B-2. OPERATIONS.

- At earliest opportunity obtain:
  - Basis for military action.
  - Intelligence assessments/analysis of political situation and military forces.
  - JCS or Joint Command issued rules of engagement (ROE).
  - Deployment and tasks in broad outline.
  - Local military and civil authorities within the allocated area.
- Prepare and publish unclassified unit ROEs for briefing at all levels of the command.
- Develop communications, internal and external.
- Check availability of interpreters.
- Conduct early coordination with other US representatives in area such as State Department.
- Be prepared for sustained involvement with representatives from US Agency for International Development and the State Department, including Embassy personnel.
- Review and coordinate psychological operations and intelligence collection plans/activities.
- Obtain appropriate mapping, charting, and geodetic products to include:
  - The area of deployment with boundary lines.
  - Fortifications constructed by the host country.
  - Minefields within the deployment area.
  - Markings.

- Illumination.
- Location of other contingents.
- Checkpoints.
- Airports and harbor.
- Transit camp.

### B-3. ADMINISTRATION.

- Personnel overseas movement qualification.
  - Have all military personnel fully qualified for overseas movement at all times.
  - Coordinate deployment program with other agencies.
  - Use exercises to qualify unit.
- Have a complete deployment program/standard operating procedure with sufficient forms and equipment ready.
- Strength:
  - Units will deploy at strengths required to support stated objectives.
- Deployability criteria:
  - Deployability criteria must be established by the headquarters responsible for providing the peacekeeping force.
  - Non-US citizens may deploy ONLY if the following conditions are met.
    - Their nation is not involved in the dispute.
    - They can obtain an official passport from their nation.
- Stabilization:
  - Service member should be stabilized for up to 6 months prior to deployment, the 6 months while deployed and 6 months following return to home station.
- Legal: Establish the military jurisdiction in the area of operations.
  - General Courts-Martial Convening Authority should be reserved to those commanders normally exercising such

jurisdiction over the units involved. Such commanders will continue to exercise jurisdiction during the deployment of subordinate units within their commands.

- Plan for exercise of legal and administrative jurisdiction over personnel left behind.

- International Law.

- All unit members will be governed by the provisions of the international agreements in effect. Commanders should insure that all persons subject to their authority are aware of the standards and limitations imposed by international law and that they adhere to them.

- Criminal and civil jurisdiction over US personnel is subject to local agreements.

- Claims:

- The United States is responsible for claims submitted by personnel assigned or attached to the unit. Personal claims of US personnel and employees will be submitted and processed pursuant to regulations.

- Leave policy:

- Emergency Leave. Approval and processing of emergency leaves is the responsibility of the unit commander. Personnel returning to CONUS on emergency leave should normally return to their unit upon completion of leave period.

- Local Leave. Policies should be determined by local commanders.

- Baggage:

- Accompanying Baggage. Individual baggage should be limited. Consideration should be given to local customs in establishing acceptable personnel clothing and items that can be taken.

- Carry-on Baggage. Individual carry-on baggage should be limited to individual weapon, one change of clothes and toilet articles.

- Hold baggage should not be authorized.

- Official Passports:

- To obtain an Official Passport, a service member must have a certified birth certificate with raised seal.

- State Department requirements for passports are normally stringent.

- Allow for at least 3 weeks to process an administratively correct application. Add at least one more week if a visa is required.

- The passports issued are Official Passports (red cover). Although they are issued for a period of 5 years, they can only be used in conjunction with official government business.

- The Installation Transportation Officer should have a supply of the required forms to meet normal requirements for passports. The required forms are:

- M-343: Request for Birth Evidence.

- DSP-11: Passport Application.

- DD FORM 1056: Authorization to Apply for a "No-fee" Passport and/or Request for Visa.

- Postal Support: Post offices should be established at base camps. Full postal services to include parcels should be provided.

- Morale, Welfare, and Recreation: Units should deploy with athletic equipment and games to support personnel. Televisions and video recorders should be provided.

- Uniform: The uniform worn should be appropriate for the geographical location of the mission.

- Red Cross: Commanders should appoint someone on their staffs to perform this task as an additional duty. Coordination should be made with international relief organizations, such as the International Committee of the Red Cross.

- Casualty/Serious Incident Reports (SIR) Reporting: Casualty/SIR reporting must be timely and accurate. Reports should include:

- Individual's name, SSN, grade and unit.

- Details of incident/injury/illness.

- Prognosis if known (after consultation with US medical personnel). (Not for SIRs)

- Evacuation/hospitalization data.

- Attending US physician. (Not for SIRs)

- Simultaneously notify the parent organization via satellite communications and transmit a casualty/SIRs report message, which includes the available data indicated above.

- The custodian of a serviceman's personnel records will verify information and submit changes and/or supplemental information.

#### B-4. LOGISTICS.

- Class I: Subsistence.

- Determine availability of in-country locally available food sources.

- Determine availability of potable and non-potable water sources.

- Determine key items that would affect the feeding of the unit in country.

- Class II: Clothing and Individual Equipment.

- Determine unusual clothing requirements for the area of operations.

- Determine availability of Class II items in-country.

- Class III: Petroleum.

- Determine availability of wholesale sources in-country.

- Determine availability of retail sources in-country.

- Determine quality of petroleum products in-country.

- Determine distribution network available in-country.

- Analysis of size of force that could be supported by existing network.

- Class IV: Construction and Fortification Material.

- Determine availability of construction and fortification materials.

- Determine factors which would affect local purchase (road network, transportation assets, etc).



- Class V: Ammunition.
  - Determine ammunition requirements for unit personnel. Will unit deploy with or will it be provided at the duty station? How much ammunition by type is required?
- Class VI: Personal Demand Items.
  - Determine availability of personal demand items on the local economy.
- Class VII: Major End Items.
  - Determine availability of in-country contract or host nation support of major end items of equipment.
- Class VIII: Medical.
  - Determine key factors and location of existing medical facilities in-country analysis of in-country support capacities.
- Class IX: Repair Parts and Components.
  - Determine availability of commercial contract repair parts from commercial sources in-country.
- Services:
  - Authority for certain local procurement of absolutely essential commodities.
  - Determine key items of interest on in-country transportation assets, and road network in-country.
  - Determine availability of air resupply and status of key movement bases in-country.
  - Determine availability of contractual services in-country.
  - Discussion of graves registration procedures in-country.
  - Determine availability of logistical assets in country.
  - Determine logistical constraints within the operations area.
  - Determine source of supplies, points of contact; and method of transactions used locally.

## APPENDIX C

### PEACEKEEPING EXERCISE

C-1. PEACEKEEPING EXERCISE. The climax to predeployment training should be a peacekeeping exercise. This would involve establishing observation posts and checkpoints in a field environment and having the unit conduct operations as if they were in an actual peacekeeping situation.

a. Each small unit would be required to observe and report as they would in the actual situation.

b. Leaders become thoroughly familiar with the reporting formats.

c. There should be a standardized briefing for official visitors.

d. Physical training, individual training, stand-to, and other functions can be conducted.

e. Normal ground and air traffic from other units moving about in the training area can provide the incidents to report.

f. A rotational type exercise where training is focused on communications and reporting procedures, fire prevention, maintenance and operation of electrical generators, improvement of fighting positions, reporting to visitors, resupply operations, and the general layout and routine of an observation post.

g. Drivers should go through an orientation of different types of driving conditions over a driving course.

C-2. EXERCISE SCOPE. The exercise should include:

a. When and how to use force.

b. How to treat people seeking protection within a US post.

c. How to act when armed groups request the extradition of people under US protection.

d. Normal alert, increased alert, and full alert procedures.

e. Patrolling.

f. What to take with you on patrol (Identification card, recognition signals).

g. How to act when fire is opened against patrols (use only small caliber weapons, shoot high and use less ammunition than other party).

h. How to choose a location for a blocking position or road block.

i. What to do with seized weapons.

j. Procedures to stop vehicles, people.

k. The use of a road block:

(1) To check a vehicle allow one private vehicle within the road block at the same time.

(2) Conduct all checks under cover of other weapons.

(3) How to check a loaded van/truck in a separate location.

(4) How to check liaison officers and their vehicles.

(5) How to inspect a private vehicle (systematic approach, the use of mirrors, flash lights, how to check gas tanks, spare wheels.

(6) How to check people (the use of a scanner without observation by other civilians). Never touch women.

1. The setting up and operation of a slow-down checkpoint, the purpose of which is to only slow traffic for observation.

**APPENDIX D**  
**PEACEKEEPING OPERATIONS**

**D-1. UNITED NATIONS.**

UNTCOK	(1947-48)	UN Temporary Commission on Korea
UNTSO	(1948- )	UN Truce Supervision Organization serving in Egypt, Israel, Jordan, Lebanon, and Syria
UNMOGIP	(1949- )	UN Military Observer Group in India and Pakistan
UNCK	(1950-54)	UN Command Korea
UNCMAC	(1954- )	UN Command, Military Armistice Commission serving in Korea
UNEF I	(1956-67)	UN Emergency Force serving in Egypt
UNOGIL	(1958)	UN Observation Group in Lebanon
ONUC	(1960-64)	Operation of the United Nations in the Congo
UNTEA	(1962-63)	UN Temporary Executive Authority serving in New Guinea
UNYOM	(1963-64)	UN Yemen Observer Mission
UNFICYP	(1964- )	UN Peacekeeping Force in Cyprus
DOMREP	(1965-66)	Mission of the Representative of the Secretary General in the Dominican Republic
UNIPOM	(1965-66)	UN India-Pakistan Observation Mission
UNEF II	(1973-79)	UN Emergency Force serving in Egypt (Suez, Sinai)
UNDOF	(1974- )	UN Disengagement Observer Force serving in Syria and Israel

UNIFIL (1978- ) UN Interim Force in Lebanon

UNGOMAP (May 88-) UN Good Offices Mission in  
Afghanistan/Pakistan

UNIIMOG (Aug 88-) UN Iran-Iraq Military Observer  
Group

UNAVEM (Jan 88-) UN Angola Verification Mission

UNTAG (Apr 89-) UN Transition Assistance  
Group serving in Namibia

D-2. NON-UN US INVOLVEMENT.

Lebanon (1958) Intervention in Lebanon

DOMREP (1965-66) Dominican Republic intervention

MFO (1981- ) Multinational Force and Observers  
serving in Egypt

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